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Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address 
the Inevitability of Financial Failure 
Iman Anabtawi* & Steven L. Schwarcz** 
Unlike many other areas of regulation, financial regulation operates in 
the context of a complex interdependent system.  The interconnections among 
firms, markets, and legal rules have implications for financial regulatory 
policy, especially the choice between ex ante regulation aimed at preventing 
financial failure and ex post regulation aimed at responding to that failure.  
Regulatory theory has paid relatively little attention to this distinction.  Were 
regulation to consist solely of duty-imposing norms, such neglect might be 
defensible.  In the context of a system, however, regulation can also take the 
form of interventions aimed at mitigating the potentially systemic consequences 
of a financial failure.  We show that this dual role of financial regulation 
implies that ex ante regulation and ex post regulation should be balanced in 
setting financial regulatory policy, and we offer guidelines for achieving that 
balance. 
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I. Introduction 
The financial system can be viewed as a complex network in which 
financial firms interact directly and indirectly (through markets) against the 
background of legal rules.  Like any system, the financial system’s behavior 
depends on its structure—the relationships among its elements.  A key 
feature of the financial system’s structure is that it possesses the 
characteristics of a high-risk system.  High-risk systems are accident-prone.  
They tend to experience long periods of stability and occasional, 
catastrophic failures. 
This Article analyzes the implications of systems analysis for reducing 
financial systemic risk,1 a serious challenge for financial regulators.  We 
begin in Part II by considering the nature of systems and the usefulness of 
systems analysis as a methodology for studying law.  Law-related systems 
are systems in which the law is an integral element.  In the financial system, 
as in any other law-related system, law can intervene at various junctures.  
In particular, it can operate ex ante, to prevent a financial failure from 
occurring, or ex post, to mitigate a financial crisis that has already been set 
in motion. 
 
1. Financial systemic risk is: 
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers 
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or 
institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting 
in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by 
substantial financial-market price volatility. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic 
Risk]. 
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We develop our distinction between ex ante and ex post regulation in 
Part III.  While this distinction is frequently made in legal scholarship, it 
has distinct implications in the context of a law-related system in general 
and the financial system specifically.  Ex ante versus ex post debates have 
traditionally been associated with the question whether the law should be 
given content before or after harmful conduct has occurred.  This 
question—whether deterrence is best served by “bright-line rules” or 
“flexible standards”—is meaningful when deterrence is the law’s primary 
aim.  In a law-related system, however, regulation can operate not only to 
prevent harmful conduct, but also to mitigate the harmful consequences that 
flow from that conduct.  As a result, law has a role to play even after 
harmful conduct has taken place. 
After developing our distinction between ex ante and ex post 
regulation in the financial system, we consider the limits of ex ante 
financial regulation.  We argue that, while relying exclusively on ex ante 
regulation might at first appear to be a desirable policy objective, it will 
always have to be supplemented by ex post regulation.  Ex ante regulation 
cannot prevent all financial crises.  Furthermore, it is unrealistic to believe 
that complete ex ante regulation could survive the political opposition of the 
financial services industry.  Finally, tight financial regulation will always 
confront the problems of chilling efficient risk taking and inducing 
regulatory arbitrage. 
In subpart IV(A), based on our study of the financial system’s features, 
we offer two types of ex post regulatory strategies for mitigating systemic 
risk.  The first, creating financial safety nets, operates on the elements of the 
financial system.  Financial safety nets are designed to absorb losses of a 
financial firm or market that has begun failing.  The second, disrupting the 
transmission of systemic risk, operates on the financial system’s 
interconnections.  Both types of intervention can mitigate the spread and 
severity of a financial failure. 
Ex post financial regulatory strategies confront legitimate criticisms.  
These include concerns about moral hazard, taxpayer burden, the danger of 
unnecessary rescues, and inefficiencies that are often associated with 
bailouts.  In subpart IV(B), we discuss these objections and respond to 
them.  In our view, the potential costs of ex post financial regulation can be 
managed and are outweighed by the potential benefits of containing 
systemic risk. 
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 (the Financial Crisis), 
the Dodd-Frank Act overhauled financial regulation in the United States.  In 
Part V we raise our concern that Dodd-Frank’s underpinnings reflect a 
strong ex ante financial regulatory bias.  Our analysis suggests that financial 
regulation should instead address systemic risk in a more balanced fashion.  
Drawing on our evaluation of the respective limits of ex ante and ex post 
regulation, we propose guidelines for accomplishing this task.  Our 
ANABTAWI(SCHWARCZ).FINAL.RESUBMIT.OC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2013  1:19 PM 
78  Texas Law Review [Vol. 92:75 
approach is designed to encourage prudent, while discouraging reckless, 
risk taking. 
II. Law and Systems 
A. The Nature of Systems 
1. Systems Structure.—A system is, broadly speaking, a group of 
interrelated elements that form a distinct whole.2  Systems can be 
categorized according to many different attributes.  For example, a system 
can be living or nonliving.3  It can be simple or complex.4  Or it can be 
stable or unstable.5  Although systems vary widely, they all possess certain 
attributes.  For something to qualify as a system, (1) it must be composed of 
elements, (2) its elements must be interconnected, and (3) it must have a 
function that is distinct from its elements.6  In the absence of any of the 
foregoing attributes, all that exists is a group of things.7 
Elements are the most basic unit of a system.8  The elements of a 
system are its component parts.  These parts may have physical properties, 
as do objects, or they may have abstract properties, as do legal rules.  
Without more, however, a collection of elements does not form a system.9  
The elements of a system have to be interconnected.  Relationships tie the 
elements of a system together.10  Finally, a system has a unique function.  
To be sure, a system’s elements have individual functions, but the 
functioning of the system as a whole is distinct from the functioning of its 
parts.11 
The human respiratory system possesses the foregoing attributes in the 
context of a familiar biological system.  First, it is composed of elements—
the nose, the trachea, the bronchial tubes, the diaphragm, and the lungs.12  
 
2. See A.D. Hall & R.E. Fagan, Definition of System, 1 GEN. SYS. 18, 18 (1956) (defining a 
system generally as “a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between 
their attributes”). 
3. James G. Miller, The Nature of Living Systems, 20 BEHAV. SCI. 343, 348 (1975). 
4. See DONELLA H. MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS: A PRIMER 22 (Diana Wright ed., 
2008) (using a bathtub as an example of a simple system and deducing from it principles that can 
be applied when analyzing more complex systems). 
5. Hall & Fagan, supra note 2, at 23. 
6. MEADOWS, supra note 4, at 11. 
7. Id. at 12. 
8. See id. (noting that “the elements of a system are often the easiest parts to notice”). 
9. Id. 
10. See Miller, supra note 3, at 347 (“A system is a set of interacting units with relationships 
among them.”). 
11. See MEADOWS, supra note 4, at 12–17 (asserting that system purposes “are not 
necessarily those intended by any single actor within the system”). 
12. JEREMY P.T. WARD ET AL., THE RESPIRATORY SYSTEM AT A GLANCE 10–13 (3d ed. 
2010). 
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Each of these elements has a unique function that can be studied in 
isolation.13  In addition, each part is connected to the others, directly or 
indirectly.14  Finally, as a whole, the human respiratory system serves a 
function that is distinct from the function of its component parts: It carries 
out the metabolic process of breathing.15 
When a group of things is either unconnected or connected in a way 
that does not give rise to a whole that serves an independent function from 
that of its parts, it is a nonsystem.16  A nonsystem possesses 
“separability.”17  Separability exists when elements act independently of 
other elements.18  A baseball card collection is an example of a nonsystem.  
Although the cards in the collection may share common properties, they are 
separable because no element of the collection depends intrinsically on 
another.  Moreover, adding or removing cards from the collection may 
change the collection’s value, but the group of cards remains a collection.  
In contrast, removing any element of the human respiratory system 
fundamentally alters the system’s behavior. 
Recognizing the distinctions between systems and nonsystems is 
important when choosing one’s level of analysis.  Nonsystems can be 
usefully analyzed by looking at their individual elements.19  Although the 
various elements of a nonsystem may be grouped together, it is not 
necessary to consider the elements as a group because doing so will not 
yield insights beyond those that can be found by analyzing the elements 
individually.  In other words, if something is not a system, then little is lost 
from studying it at the elemental level. 
If we were to study only the individual elements of a system, however, 
we would be ignoring the relationships among the elements as well as the 
functioning of the system as a whole.  In a system, the state of each element 
is conditional on the states of the others.20  Restricting our level of analysis 
to the elements would ignore each element’s effects on the other elements.  
More broadly, we would miss the connections between each element and 
the system of which they were a part.  Understanding and predicting a 
 
13. See id. (describing the functions of the parts of the respiratory system). 
14. Id. 
15. See id. 
16. See Miller, supra note 3, at 362 n.7 (“Were there no communication between [parts] there 
would be no organization, for we would merely have a collection of individual elements isolated 
from each other.”). 
17. See id. (explaining that organized systems demonstrate “conditionality” while nonsystems 
demonstrate “separability”). 
18. See id. (noting that separability occurs in mechanical forms when “what looks like one 
machine proves to be composed of two (or more) sub-machines, each of which is acting 
independently of the others”). 
19. See id. 
20. Id. 
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system’s behavior thus requires a knowledge of both the elements of a 
system and how those elements interact. 
2. Systems Behavior.—Not surprisingly, the structural differences 
between systems and nonsystems give rise to differences in their respective 
behaviors.  Recall that a nonsystem is composed of elements whose states 
are independent of each other.21  Being nothing more than a group of 
unconnected things, nonsystems do not exhibit any behavior apart from the 
behavior of their constituent parts.22  Thus, the behavior of a nonsystem can 
be analyzed satisfactorily in terms of its discrete elements. 
A fundamentally different approach is needed when analyzing the 
behavior of systems.  As a result of the connections among a system’s 
elements, activity in one element may affect the behavior of the other 
elements.23  In addition, a system has its own behavior.24  An important 
insight of systems theory is that a system’s behavior is the product of its 
underlying structure.25  Much of the power of systems analysis comes from 
this insight.  It helps explain, for example, why similar patterns of behavior 
arise in a variety of different contexts.26  These patterns often result from 
certain structurally similar features of the systems.27  It follows that 
behaviors, either desirable or undesirable, that are latent within a system, 
that is, that have not yet revealed themselves, can potentially be addressed 
by analyzing and altering the system’s structure. 
3. Systems Functions.—Systems also have functions.28  The primary 
function of the respiratory system is the exchange of gases.29  An inventory 
control system’s function is to manage the availability of stocks for 
production, sales, or delivery.30  The Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 
filing system’s function is to communicate the possible existence and 
 
21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
22. See MEADOWS, supra note 4, at 12 (observing that when an element is taken away from a 
nonsystem its function does not change). 
23. See id. at 12–13 (using a tree system to illustrate how interconnections between elements 
can cause changes in one element to affect the behavior of other elements in a system). 
24. See id. at 15 (explaining that a system’s purpose is not necessarily the same as those of its 
elements). 
25. Id. at 89. 
26. See id. (noting that different feedback-loop structures cause different behaviors). 
27. See id. at 27–29 (describing two systems of the same structure, balancing feedback loops, 
that exhibit similar behavior). 
28. Id. at 11. 
29. WARD, supra note 12, at 11. 
30. See SVEN AXSÄTER, INVENTORY CONTROL 1–2 (2006) (characterizing an inventory 
system as balancing the conflicting goals of an organization’s purchasing, production, and 
marketing departments). 
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priority of a security interest.31  In each of these examples, the relevant 
system’s elements operate together to produce one or more distinct overall 
system functions.  The most accurate way to determine the functions of a 
system is to observe the system in operation.32  Systems generate outputs.33  
By identifying the results that a system produces, one can deduce the 
system’s functions. 
As a positive matter, a system can be regarded as “goal-seeking” in the 
sense that it is a means to an end.34  In this sense, a system has no function 
apart from producing the results that the system in fact generates.  In 
normative terms, however, one can assign goals to a system that need not be 
aligned with how the system functions.35  In other words, the designers of a 
system may desire certain goals for the system even if the system is not 
producing them.  Systems often “add up to an overall behavior that no one 
wants.”36  Importantly, when a system’s functions deviate unacceptably 
from the goals that have been established for it, it may be possible to alter 
the system to achieve more desirable outcomes.37 
B. Law-Related Systems 
1. Identifying Law-Related Systems.—We consider a system to be 
“law-related” if law is an integral element of the system.38  By definition, 
the elements of a system are interconnected.  Not all of a system’s elements 
are equally important to the system, however.39  We refer to an element as 
being “integral” to a system if removal of that element would alter the 
system’s behavior in some salient way.  Thus, in a law-related system, the 
state of the law plays a critical role in how the system operates.40 
 
31. See McCarthy v. BMW Bank of N. Am., 509 F.3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[A] 
principal purpose[] of [the Article is] to enforce the policy against secret liens by demanding strict 
compliance with filing or recording requirements.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
32. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 503–04 
(1997) (detailing the use of observation to discern the functions of a system’s subsystems and, in 
turn, the function of the larger system). 
33. Id. at 503. 
34. Id. at 485. 
35. Id. at 503. 
36. MEADOWS, supra note 4, at 15. 
37. See id. at 16–17 (describing how a system can be altered by changes in its elements, 
interconnections, and functions). 
38. See LoPucki, supra note 32, at 488–89 (describing a law-related system and 
distinguishing it from a legal system). 
39. See MEADOWS, supra note 4, at 16 (noting that changing an element “usually has the least 
effect on the system” but that “particular elements of a system can indeed be important”). 
40. Not all systems are law-related, of course.  Our solar system consists of the sun and the 
astronomical objects gravitationally bound in orbit around it.  Positive law is not an element of the 
solar system and so cannot influence its behavior.  A United States Supreme Court decision that 
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2. Using Systems Analysis as a Methodology to Analyze Law.—Once 
we identify a system as being law-related, we can use systems analysis as a 
methodology for studying law’s role in it.  Systems analysis involves 
seeking to understand a system’s structure, connections, and functions.41  
Professor Lynn LoPucki, who has applied a systems-analysis approach to 
several law-related systems, sees systems analysis as “build[ing] upon 
traditional methods of analyzing the law.”42 
Systems analysts consider the parts of a system from the standpoint of 
their roles within the system as a whole.43  Instead of screening out the 
dynamic nature of systems, they screen it in.  To be sure, the elements of a 
system are important to the systems analyst.  They are, after all, the 
system’s building blocks.  Systems analysts believe, however, that the 
functioning of a system’s elements cannot be properly understood without 
reference to those elements’ interactions.44  Put differently, the relationships 
between the parts of a system are as important to systems analysts as the 
way the parts function individually.  Relatedly, systems analysts see the 
behavior of the whole of a system as depending, in part, on the system’s 
individual elements.45  They view studying the whole directly, without 
reference to its parts, as ignoring valuable information.  According to 
systems analysts, the functioning of the whole has much, though not 
everything, to do with the functioning of its individual elements.46 
To make the systems-analysis approach more concrete, consider the 
example of an ant colony.  Most people would agree that an ant colony is 
something more than a collection of ants.  Members of an ant colony 
perform distinct tasks, such as “foraging, nest maintenance, patrolling, and 
midden work” (cleanup of debris).47  This allocation of tasks is an important 
 
declares it unconstitutional for the earth to revolve around the sun will have no effect on the 
earth’s path.  Thus, the solar system, like most physical systems, is not a law-related system. 
Unlike physical systems, social systems are often law-related.  The judicial system, the 
health care system, and the bankruptcy system, to name only a few examples, are all law-related 
systems.  Law plays an important role in each of them.  Remove the element of the law from any 
of these systems, and it would behave very differently. 
41. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 32, at 482–83 (“To ‘analyze’ a system is to break it down 
into its constituent parts, to determine the nature and identity of its subsystems, and to explain the 
relationships among them.”). 
42. Id. at 509. 
43. See id. at 503–05 (explaining that any systems analysis must include the analysis of its 
component parts and how they contribute to the overall function of the system). 
44. See MEADOWS, supra note 4, at 13–14 (demonstrating the importance of interconnections 
through a description of the interconnection of the elements of a tree system). 
45. See id. at 17 (“To ask whether elements, interconnections, or purposes are most important 
in a system is to ask an unsystemic question.  All are essential.”). 
46. See id. at 15 (explaining that while the functions of individual elements of a system are 
important, the function or purpose of the whole system is not necessarily the same as the function 
intended by the individual elements). 
47. NINO BOCCARA, MODELING COMPLEX SYSTEMS 1–2 (R. Stephen Berry et al. eds., 2004). 
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feature of an ant colony.  Limiting oneself to studying the discrete tasks of 
individual ants, however, would eclipse the cooperative ant behavior 
evident at the level of the colony.  At the level of the colony, task allocation 
among ants is continually adjusting.48  As conditions change, ants redeploy 
themselves accordingly.49  Considering the colony’s dynamics is necessary 
to understand the processes by which individual ants assume various tasks. 
Systems analysis recognizes that a system, such as an ant colony, 
consists of both its elements and their relationships to each other.  As a 
methodology for analyzing law-related systems, it gives us the means to 
look beyond a system’s elements to their relationships within the system as 
a whole.  More specifically, it provides us with a framework for analyzing 
how and why certain elements of a system affect others, whether the 
operation of the system is achieving its goals, and how the law can 
intervene when the system produces undesirable results.50 
Systems analysis of law-related systems formalizes and makes explicit 
the relationships between law and its broader contexts.51  The systems-
analysis methodology provides insights into law’s role in systems that 
traditional methods of legal analysis are likely to miss.  Analytical legal 
scholarship typically identifies a particular problem and uses a certain 
approach to solve it.52  Limiting the scope of a project in this way has the 
advantage of making it more tractable.53  The disadvantage of focusing 
narrowly on a specific problem, however, is that it sets aside the broader 
context in which that problem exists.54  By screening out related elements of 
the system, as well as the system’s interconnections, traditional legal 
scholarship is often forced to treat law’s dynamic effects, to the extent it 
does so at all, discretely.55 
 
48. Id. at 2. 
49. Id. 
50. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 32, at 506–07 (laying out a process by which normative 
analyses could uncover “system-unintended” results and correct those results). 
51. See id. at 480–82 (describing how systems analysis operationalizes concepts by 
“accommodat[ing] as much complexity as possible,” allowing every proposition to be tested 
empirically and asserting that systems analysis “has the potential to put legal scholarship in touch 
with reality”). 
52. Id. at 480. 
53. Id. 
54. See id. (criticizing this approach because it can “screen[] out important aspects” and may 
“lead[] the analyst to the wrong conclusion”); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the 
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern 
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 906 (1996) (“Our legal system has been fundamentally 
reductionist in approach as well as in theory.”). 
55. See J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of 
Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1411 (1996) 
(“It is impossible to understand and manage the dynamical qualities of law and society by dividing 
them into separate spheres, subdividing those spheres into separate compartments, and so on.”). 
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3. The Role of Law in Law-Related Systems.—The systems-analysis 
paradigm has concrete implications for how law can influence the behavior 
of a law-related system.  It is especially helpful in elucidating the role that 
law can play intertemporally,56 at various junctures in the operation of the 
system, because a system’s behavior often unfolds over time.57  
Intertemporally, law can operate over three different time periods: 
(1) before the occurrence of an event, (2) after the event has occurred but 
before its repercussions have ended, and (3) after the full effects of the 
event have been sustained.58  At each of these junctures, law’s intervention 
can have important effects. 
When law operates to avert a harm, it is operating preventively.59  
Preventive law is designed to reduce or eliminate problems before they 
arise in the first place.60  Law can also help to mitigate the negative 
consequences of a harmful event after it has occurred.61  Law would operate 
here to halt or slow the progress of those consequences to minimize further 
losses.  Mitigative intervention can take over where preventive intervention 
leaves off.62 
C. The Financial System as a Law-Related System 
Our purpose in this subpart is not to attempt to describe in detail what 
is commonly known as the “financial system” but rather to establish the 
financial system as a law-related system.  As we have defined it, a system 
incorporates elements, interconnections, and functions.63  Further, a law-
related system is a particular type of system in which law is an integral 
element.64 
 
56. Within the field of statistics, intertemporality is referred to as “time series.”  See generally 
GENSHIRO KITAGAWA, INTRODUCTION TO TIME SERIES MODELING (2010) (describing time 
series in the same manner as intertemporality). 
57. See MEADOWS, supra note 4, at 2 (defining a system as “a set of things . . . interconnected 
in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behavior over time” (emphasis added)). 
58. See Timothy F. Malloy, Principled Prevention, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 6–7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304420 
(describing two approaches to chemical regulation, one that seeks to avoid the use of such 
chemicals and the other that seeks to mitigate the harmful effects of their use). 
59. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. (manuscript at 3–4). 
62. Even after the full effects of a harmful event have been sustained, law may have a role to 
play.  At this juncture, law can attempt to help participants in the system cope with the effects of 
the system’s behavior through measures designed to alleviate suffering.  For purposes of this 
Article, we focus on the preventive and mitigative roles of law and set aside law’s role of 
intervening to alleviate suffering after the full consequences of a harmful event have occurred.  
Our rationale for excluding such palliative measures from the scope of our analysis is that we 
believe the ultimate distribution of losses associated with economic shocks involves choices best 
made through political decisions that do not bear on the operation of the financial system. 
63. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
64. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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A functional approach to identifying the elements of the financial 
system looks to the objective purposes that the financial system serves.65  It 
then attempts to discern the elements that further those purposes within the 
system.66  An alternative to a functional approach is to adopt an institutional 
one.67  An institutional perspective identifies a system’s elements based on 
whether they possess specified legal attributes.68  The difficulty with using 
an institutional approach to identify the elements of the financial system is 
that it is unlikely to be adaptive when the system is experiencing change.69  
For example, as a result of regulatory arbitrage, substantial financial 
intermediation—the process of transforming loans into credit—moved from 
commercial banks to shadow banks between 1990 and 2007.70  Like 
traditional banks, shadow banks intermediate between borrowers and 
lenders.71  Unlike traditional banks, however, they operate without formal 
government guarantees and without formal access to central bank 
liquidity.72  Failure to subject shadow banks to a regulatory regime similar 
to that which applies to traditional banks is widely believed to have 
contributed to the buildup of risks in the financial system in the period 
leading up to the Financial Crisis.73 
The elements of the financial system can be identified functionally as 
those institutions or processes involved in the provision, allocation, or 
 
65. See GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND 
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 13 (2008), available at http://www.group30.org/ 
images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial%20Supe rvision.pdf (explaining that under a 
functional approach, supervisory oversight is determined by the business being transacted by the 
entity). 
66. See id. at 26–27 (using Italy as an example of the use of the functional approach and 
describing the details of its regulatory system). 
67. Id. at 13. 
68. Id. 
69. Cf. Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law: Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional 
Economics Framework, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER (Kaal et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 
(describing the dynamic nature of regulation). 
70. Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution of 
Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. LAW 225, 227–28 (2010); see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458, SHADOW BANKING 8 fig.1 (rev. 2012).  The shift to less regulated 
intermediaries has also come about as new, more efficient firms entered financial markets.  See 
Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (2010) (“Many of 
the less-regulated firms are new market participants that, independent of regulatory differences, 
are more efficient in managing risk than traditional intermediaries.”). 
71. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 70, at 10. 
72. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility 
Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 14–15), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159455. 
73. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 70, at 1 (contending that shadow 
banking contributed to price appreciation in real estate prior to the financial crisis). 
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deployment of financial capital.74  From this perspective, the financial 
system consists of three principal elements—firms, markets, and legal rules.  
Financial firms are the most basic units of the financial system.  They 
perform intermediation services.75  Financial firms consist of commercial 
banks and other financial market participants, such as investment banks, 
insurance companies, and investment funds.76  They also include 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which purchase, guaranty, and 
securitize mortgages.77  Collectively, financial firms are important sources 
of financial capital for economic activity.78 
Financial markets are another important element of the financial 
system.  Financial markets are markets in which financial assets are 
traded.79  These markets facilitate the allocation of capital.80  Increasingly, 
financial markets are also supplanting the use of intermediaries as a source 
of financing.  This trend is the result of disintermediation—the ability to 
access capital directly through markets; that is, without going through banks 
or other financial intermediaries.81 
Both financial firms and financial markets operate within the context 
of various bodies of regulation, which govern the provision, allocation, and 
deployment of financial capital.82  While these regulations are highly 
 
74. See generally Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the 
Financial Environment, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 3, 5 (Dwight B. Crane et al. eds., 
1995) (stating that the primary purpose of the financial system is resource allocation). 
75. See Whitehead, supra note 70, at 3 (referring to securities firms, banks, and insurance 
companies, among other financial institutions, as intermediaries). 
76. JEFF MADURA, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 11–13 (Joe Sabatino et al. eds., 
10th ed. 2010). 
77. GSEs are privately owned corporations established by a charter from Congress.  U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-91-17, BUDGET ISSUES: PROFILES OF GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 1 (1991).  They serve to direct funds to particular financial sectors in 
which private credit markets are insufficient.  Id. at 6.  In particular, they “engage in business 
operations in the private sector to increase the flow of credit to home buyers, farmers, students, 
and colleges.”  Id.  Examples of GSEs include the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Financing 
Corporation (FICO).  Id. 
78. See MADURA, supra note 76, at 10 (describing how financial firms serve an important 
purpose by “accept[ing] funds from surplus units and channel[ing] the funds to deficit units” and 
asserting that “[w]ithout financial institutions, the information and transaction costs of financial 
market transactions would be excessive”). 
79. Id. at 3. 
80. See id. (“Financial markets transfer funds from those who have excess funds to those who 
need funds.”). 
81. See WESLEY B. TRUITT, THE CORPORATION 107–09 (2006) (describing two direct 
methods through which companies can access capital directly from the market: “issuing stock and 
undertaking debt”).  Firms often use capital markets to turn illiquid assets into cash.  For instance, 
through securitization, banks can turn long-term mortgages into easily tradable securities.  MEIR 
KOHN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 381 (2d ed. 2004).  Also, firms often can borrow 
more cheaply through bonds and commercial paper than they can from banks.  See id. at 145. 
82. More broadly, the financial system is “legally constructed.”  Katharina Pistor, A Legal 
Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 317 (2013).  Contract law specifies the rights and 
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fragmented among administrative authorities,83 they fall into four basic 
types.  Market-integrity regulation promotes fairness in the interactions 
among financial market participants.84  It encompasses disclosure 
requirements, oversight of trading exchanges, and prohibitions on unfair 
trading practices and market manipulation.85  A second category of financial 
regulation is competition regulation.  Competition regulation addresses the 
structure of financial markets.86  It seeks to cause financial markets to 
behave competitively by overseeing both market conduct and market 
conditions.87  Prudential regulation, or regulation that aims to ensure that 
financial firms behave “prudently,” addresses the risks to which financial 
firms are subject.88  It is concerned primarily with whether financial firms 
are able to meet their obligations to their counterparties.89  Prudential 
regulation includes capital adequacy, solvency, and liquidity requirements; 
investment guidelines; and procedures for undertaking risk management.90  
Finally, consumer-protection regulation governs the relationship between 
financial firms and their retail customers.91  Its scope includes the adequacy 
of information disclosure, the reasonableness of the terms of products and 
services, and the fairness of procedures for resolving disputes.92  
Collectively, the pervasiveness of the foregoing types of financial 
regulation establish law as another integral element of the financial 
system.93 
 
obligations of the parties to financial instruments; corporate law limits the liability of investors; 
and bankruptcy law allocates losses among competing creditors.  See generally id. at 315–21. 
83. See generally Alejandro Komai & Gary Richardson, A Brief History of Regulations 
Regarding Financial Markets in the United States: 1789 to 2009 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 17443, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17443 (arguing that 
“fragmented regulatory authority is . . . the root cause of financial instability”). 
84. JEFFREY CARMICHAEL & MICHAEL POMERLEANO, THE DEVELOPMENT AND REG-
ULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 26 (2002). 
85. Id. at 26, 35. 
86. Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International 
Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 173, 178–79 (2005). 
87. Id. 
88. Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulating 
Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 884. 
89. Id. at 884–85. 
90. Id. at 883–85. 
91. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 30 (2012) (tracing U.S. consumer-protection 
regulation back to acts that prohibited deceptive consumer lending practices). 
92. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 1011, 1028, 1032, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964, 2003–04, 2006–07 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5491, 5518, 5532 (2012)) (establishing the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to 
regulate consumer financial products and giving the Bureau the power to, inter alia, prescribe 
rules to ensure accuracy of disclosures and limit the use of arbitration agreements with consumer 
financial products). 
93. Cf. Pistor, supra note 82, at 325 (“[L]aw is essential to the very existence of contemporary 
finance . . . .”). 
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The various elements of the financial system are highly inter-
connected.94  Their linkages give the financial system the characteristics of 
a network.95  In a network, the relationships among elements are the means 
by which a change in the state of one element is transmitted to the other 
elements.96  The Financial Crisis was in large part a story about the 
relationships among the elements of the financial system, many aspects of 
which were previously underappreciated.97  The most explicit of these 
relationships are direct contracts, such as derivatives.98  Derivatives, 
including credit-default swaps (CDS),99 allow firms to trade credit risks on 
a variety of exposures.100  Because of these interconnecting contracts, one 
party’s default on its obligations may cause its counterparties to default on 
their own obligations, leading to a domino-effect collapse.101 
The domino model of contagion describes a mechanism by which 
shocks are transmitted directly between financial firms in a network.102  
Another way that shocks can affect the financial system is through financial 
markets.  In a market-based financial system, an asset’s price responds to 
supply and demand.103  When financial firms are simultaneously seeking 
liquidity in order to meet regulatory requirements, margin calls, or 
withdrawal requests, risky assets may need to be sold at market prices 
 
94. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 77, 96 (2009) (describing the modern financial system as an “interwoven network of 
financial obligations”). 
95. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Financial Markets and Networks—Implications for Financial 
Market Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 613, 613 (2009). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
211, 235 (2009) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity]. 
99. In a credit-default swap, one party (the credit “seller”) agrees, in exchange for the 
payment to it of a fee by a second party (the credit “buyer”), to assume the credit risk of certain 
debt obligations of a specified borrower or other obligor.  STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 10:1.1 (Adam D. Ford ed., 
3d ed., rev. 2010).  If a “credit event” (for example, default or bankruptcy) occurs in respect of 
that obligor, the credit seller will either (a) pay the credit buyer an amount calculated by reference 
to the post-default value of the debt obligations or (b) buy the debt obligations (or other eligible 
debt obligations of the obligor) for their full face value from the credit buyer.  Id. § 10:3.1. 
100. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 98. 
101. Id.; Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 198–99; see also Hal S. Scott, 
Interconnectedness and Contagion, COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REG. 5, (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2012.11.20_ Interconnectedness_and_Contagion.pdf (asserting 
that interconnectedness of financial institutions can pose a systemic risk to a financial firm’s 
liabilities). 
102. See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 16 (2009) (explaining the domino effect through a hypothetical involving three 
banks); see also Thijs Markwat et al., Contagion as a Domino Effect in Global Stock Markets, 33 
J. BANKING & FIN. 1996, 1996 (2009) (discussing domino patterns in which local stock market 
crashes evolve into regional, and then global, crashes). 
103. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 102, at 19 (explaining the supply and demand 
response of assets and the impact of these changes on economic shocks). 
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below their fundamental values, or “fire-sale” prices.104  The decline in the 
market value of those assets can then lead to further asset sales and price 
declines precipitated by additional demands for funds.105  Markets thus 
provide channels through which pressure on the price of an asset can be 
transmitted throughout the financial system.106 
In addition to having interrelated elements, systems have functions, or 
goals, that are distinct from those of their individual elements.  As we 
discussed in section II(A)(3), a system’s functions may be described in 
either positive or normative terms.  The positive function of a system is 
whatever outcome the system in fact produces.  The normative function of a 
system, on the other hand, is the outcome that policy makers believe the 
system ought to produce.  When the positive and normative functions of a 
system differ, the system is departing from its target outcome.107 
We alluded above to the financial system’s basic functions of 
providing, allocating, and deploying financial capital.108  More specifically, 
the financial system aggregates savings from disparate sources, originates 
financial instruments for use in transferring risk, provides liquidity for 
holders of financial instruments, furnishes credit to finance consumption 
and investment spending, and provides a mechanism for making 
payments.109  The financial system serves these ends as a positive matter. 
In addition to identifying the financial system’s positive functions, we 
can attribute a normative function, or goal, to it.  In Thinking in Systems, 
Donella Meadows pointed out how dramatically a change in a system’s 
designated function can alter the system’s behavior.110  She suggested 
imagining keeping the players and rules of a game the same, but changing 
its goal from winning to losing.111  In Meadows’s example, reversing the 
 
104. See Yesha Yadav, Looking for the Silver Lining: Regulatory Reform After the “Credit 
Crunch,” 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 314, 320 (2010) (illustrating how lack of liquidity can lead to 
the sale of assets at fire-sale prices when a bank experiences a bank run). 
105. See id. (“Where firms hold similar types of assets, the fall in market value will impact 
the economy as a whole and throw a number of firms into the same state of crisis as the originally 
troubled institution(s).”). 
106. In financial markets, where risk exposures are continually adjusting in the presence of 
information uncertainty, systemic transmission of localized shocks need not even require that 
firms be contractually linked or that they conduct fire sales.  If it is not possible to determine 
which firms are exposed to securities that have become distressed, market participants may 
assume that all similarly situated firms have such exposure and refuse to extend credit to them.  
See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 160 
(2011) (noting that lenders will see similar institutions as having similar risk and discussing the 
importance for institutions to signal that they are not subject to these same risks). 
107. See supra section II(A)(3). 
108. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
109. PETER S. ROSE & MILTON H. MARQUIS, MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 7–10 (9th ed. 
2006). 
110. MEADOWS, supra note 4, at 16–17. 
111. Id. at 16. 
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purpose of the system reverses its behavior.  In our context, a clear 
identification of purpose provides the basis for evaluating the performance 
of, and prescribing alternative regulatory strategies for influencing, the 
financial system.  Our assessment of how well the financial system behaves 
depends on how we want it to behave. 
A central normative goal of financial regulatory policy is to promote 
economic efficiency.112  Achieving efficiency entails correcting market 
failures.113  In the financial system, numerous market failures can lead to 
excessive risk taking.114  These include agency problems, behavioral biases, 
information uncertainty with respect to financial products and markets, and 
a type of tragedy of the commons in which finite capital resources are 
exploited.115  These market failures provide a basis, on efficiency grounds, 
for regulating the financial system.116 
Arguably, financial regulatory policy should adopt the additional 
normative goal of financial stability.117  Financial stability exists when the 
financial system can sustain shocks without significant impairment to its 
activities.118  A crisis in the financial system imposes substantial social 
costs.119  Although these effects are encompassed under a broad view of 
economic efficiency, they are sometimes regarded as implicating non-
efficiency considerations.120 
 
112. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 815, 825 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos].  An allocation of 
resources is economically efficient if resources cannot be reallocated so as to “make one person 
better off without making another person worse off.”  IVAN PNG & DALE LEHMAN, MANAGERIAL 
ECONOMICS 145 (3d ed. 2007). 
113. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 112, at 818; see also PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995) (defining market 
failure as “[a]n imperfection in a price system that prevents an efficient allocation of resources”). 
114. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Toward an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1352 (2011) (arguing that market failures 
“collectively obscure or motivate firms to ignore the impact of their risk taking on systemic 
stability”). 
115. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 112, at 818–21, 822 & n.24, 824 & 
n.35; see Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 379 n.35, 404–06 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Protecting Financial Markets] (arguing that the global financial crisis can be attributed in large 
part to conflicts, complacency, and complexity, as well as to a type of tragedy of the commons, 
within the financial system). 
116. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 231–34 (explaining that, at best, market 
discipline is an attractive supplement to other regulatory mechanisms). 
117. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (stating as its purpose “[t]o promote the financial stability of 
the United States”). 
118. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 207–08 (noting that systemic risk threatens the 
viability of a financial system’s stability). 
119. Id. at 207. 
120. See id. (arguing that systemic risk demands that goals for the system go beyond 
economic efficiency to include the preservation of the financial system’s stability). 
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Taking into account the value of financial stability, even an efficient 
financial system might produce financial crises too frequently.121  This 
Article assumes that preserving the financial system is socially desirable 
and that financial regulators should pursue its stability.  We believe that an 
ideal financial regulatory regime would balance the dual normative goals of 
efficiency and stability of the financial system.122 
III. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Financial Regulation in a Systems Paradigm 
In Part II, we argued that financial regulation operates in a law-related 
system in which events in one period can affect conditions in later periods.  
We also argued that deterring harmful conduct through preventive measures 
is only one of the objectives that financial regulation can serve.  Another 
important objective for financial regulation is to mitigate the adverse 
consequences of a harmful event after it has taken place and its effects have 
already been set in motion.  In this Part III, we set forth more precisely our 
distinction between ex ante and ex post financial regulation and argue that 
ex post regulation will always be needed to mitigate systemic risk. 
A. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Financial Regulation 
The distinction between ex ante and ex post regulation is a familiar one 
in legal scholarship.123  The question whether a law is deemed ex ante or ex 
post is typically framed around conduct.124  Ex ante measures target conduct 
before it occurs; ex post measures target conduct after it has already 
occurred.125  Law and economics scholars, in particular, have devoted 
 
121. See W.A. Brock et al., More Hedging Instruments May Destabilize Markets, 33 J. ECON. 
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1912, 1912–13 (2009) (arguing that more hedging instruments may 
destabilize the market); Fabio Caccioli et al., Eroding Market Stability by Proliferation of 
Financial Instruments 2–3 (Oct. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.0064 (arguing that the proliferation of financial instruments leads to 
market instability); Matteo Marsili, Complexity and Financial Stability in a Large Random 
Economy 2–3 (Sept. 8, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1415971 (arguing that, even under ideal conditions, unregulated financial innovation can 
lead to financial instability); Fabio Caccioli & Matteo Marsili, Information Efficiency and 
Financial Stability, ECON.: THE OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-JOURNAL 2 (July 14, 
2010), http://dx.doiorg/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-20 (arguing that the closer a financial 
market is to ideal conditions, the more they are prone to imperfections). 
122. In some circumstances, these goals will conflict because regulation that seeks to promote 
stability could have undesirable effects.  See infra subparts III(B), IV(B).  In these instances, 
policy makers will need to balance the value of financial market efficiency against that of 
systemic stability. 
123. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572–74 
(2004) (discussing the fundamental dimensions of legal intervention). 
124. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 568–70 (1992) (discussing the effects of ex ante and ex post rulemaking on conduct). 
125. Id. at 559–60. 
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substantial attention to whether social welfare is maximized through the 
promulgation of ex ante or ex post approaches.126 
Ex ante measures are often associated with rules or preventive 
regulation.127  Rules and preventive regulation are laws, the content of 
which is provided before conduct occurs.128  Their operation is resolved in 
advance of the targeted activity.129  Ex post measures tend to be associated 
with standards or litigation.130  Unlike rules, standards and litigation do not 
entail advance resolution of what constitutes permissible conduct.131  Their 
content is determined after the conduct to which it applies has taken 
place.132 
It is useful to organize the distinction between ex ante and ex post 
regulation around conduct if one assumes that deterrence is the law’s 
primary objective.  This assumption is often made with respect to many 
areas of regulatory law.133  The problem addressed in each case is the same: 
How should the law be structured to regulate harmful conduct in a way that 
minimizes net social costs?134 
In a law-related system, however, the purpose of regulation is not only 
to prevent harmful conduct, but also to avoid harmful consequences.135  
Framing the distinction between ex ante and ex post regulation around 
conduct would thus be incomplete.  While regulatory policy in a law-related 
system plays a role in deterring harmful behavior, it also has a role to play 
in addressing the systemic effects of that behavior should it nonetheless 
take place. 
In order to account for the intertemporal dimension of law-related 
systems, whereby law can intervene at different junctures in a system’s 
operation, it is necessary to move beyond the traditional conduct-based 
understanding of how law works.  We do this by organizing the ex ante–
ex post distinction around law’s impact.  In the context of the financial 
 
126. See, e.g., id. at 568–71 (describing the social objectives of law structure to be the 
maximization of benefits net of costs). 
127. See Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical 
Framework, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 
11, 13 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010) (stating that “regulation tends to use ex ante preventative 
means of control”). 
128. See id. (providing traffic rules and regulations as examples of ex ante measures). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. (providing examples of ex post measures such as criminal prosecutions for drunk 
driving that do not provide for advance resolution of what constitutes permissible conduct). 
132. Id. at 15. 
133. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 384 (1985). 
134. See Kaplow, supra note 124. 
135. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 
10–11, 23–26 (1976) (noting that reasons given for regulation include protection of particular 
classes of persons and the economic system as a whole from the consequences of failures). 
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system, regulation can have two effects.  First, it can help to prevent 
negative financial shocks from occurring.  Second, it can help to mitigate 
the harm from financial shocks after they occur.  We refer to the former, 
preventive role of financial regulation as ex ante and to the latter, mitigative 
role of financial regulation as ex post.136 
B. The Limits of Ex Ante Financial Regulation 
If ex ante regulation were always successful, the financial system 
would never experience a crisis.  The elements of the financial system 
would never fail, and the interconnections among them would always 
function smoothly.  Complete ex ante financial regulation, whereby 
regulators can prevent every failure, is an unrealistic goal, however.  As we 
argue below, it is futile, impractical, and not necessarily desirable as a 
means for achieving an efficient and stable financial system. 
1. Normal Accidents.—Accidents happen.  Moreover, according to 
Charles Perrow, some systems are “high risk,” or “prone to system 
accidents.”137  Accidents within these systems are uncommon, but this is 
hardly reassuring because, when they do occur, they can be catastrophic.138 
Perrow used the term “normal accidents” to characterize accidents, or 
failures, that occur within a system notwithstanding preventive measures.139  
The term describes not the frequency of failures but rather their 
inevitability.140  As he put it bluntly, “[I]t is normal for us to die, but we 
only do it once.”141 
The high-risk systems that Perrow argued were susceptible to normal 
accidents have two characteristics.142  They possess both “interactive 
complexity” and “tight coupling.”143  A system is interactively complex if 
the relationships among its elements exhibit unexpected sequences—
 
136. Our use of the term ex post regulation is distinct from the way in which the term is used 
by other scholars—namely, as referring to the ad hoc institution of regulations following a 
financial crisis.  See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 
1064 (2009) (using ex post to describe regulations that are used to ensure firms have the financial 
cushion to withstand future economic downturns); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 
GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011) (discussing the use of bailouts as an ex post regulation measure). 
137. CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 16–
18 (Princeton Univ. Press 1999). 
138. Id. at 18. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. See Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard & Arnold M. Howitt, Understanding and Coping with 
the Increasing Risk of System-Level Accidents, in INTEGRATIVE RISK MANAGEMENT: ADVANCED 
DISASTER RECOVERY 13, 13–26 (Simon Woodward ed., 2010) (noting the two characteristics of 
high-risk systems and advancing the view that forces in the ways that economic, financial, and 
physical systems co-evolve make system-level failures more prevalent over time). 
143. PERROW, supra note 137, at 17–18. 
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sequences that are either unobservable or incomprehensible.144  A tightly 
coupled system is one that is highly interdependent, so that a disturbance to 
one part of the system can spread almost instantaneously to other parts of 
the system.145  Taken together, interactive complexity and tight coupling 
imply that high-risk systems pose a serious challenge for regulators: their 
elements will, rarely but surely, interact rapidly and in unanticipated 
ways.146 
Although Perrow developed normal accident theory in the context of 
high-risk technologies,147 the theory is readily applicable to the financial 
system.148  The financial system is comprised of firms and markets that are 
interactive and operate with incomplete information.149  Participants within 
the financial system are not fully aware of either the characteristics of the 
financial instruments that others in the system hold or the topology of the 
network that describes the system’s structure.150  Such uncertainty makes it 
difficult to ascertain the vulnerabilities of individual firms and markets to 
external shocks.151  Difficulties in assessing these vulnerabilities can, in 
turn, lead to unanticipated failures—a consequence of interactive 
complexity.152 
The financial system also exhibits tight coupling.  A failure by any 
given firm can reverberate throughout the financial system by way of a 
variety of avenues.  Direct contracts are one such pathway.  Under a credit-
default swap, for example, the seller of the swap insures the buyer against 
the risk that a third party will default on its debt obligation to the buyer.153  
If the seller of the swap is unable to meet its obligation to the buyer and the 
 
144. Id. at 130. 
145. Id. at 17. 
146. See id. at 18. 
147. Id. at 17. 
148. Michael Power, Preparing for Financial Surprise, 19 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS 
MGMT. 28, 30 (2011); Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Rethinking the 
Financial Network 11–12 (Apr. 28, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf). 
149. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1371 & n.86, 1393. 
150. See id. at 1393–94 (stressing that firms are unaware of the ways in which they are 
interconnected and to what degree crises will spread through those connections). 
151. See Michael J. Naylor et al., A Network Theory of Financial Cascades 5 (July 23, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1184604 (concluding that the impact of any disturbance to the financial system cannot be 
understood without examining both the characteristics of individual nodes and the entire topology 
of the financial system). 
152. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 98, at 231–36.  Kathryn Judge has 
observed that interactive complexity has increased with the proliferation of “fragmentation 
nodes”—the legal structures created upon the transformation of one type of asset into another.  
Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic 
Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 659–60, 676 (2012). 
153. See supra note 99. 
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obligation is sufficiently large, the buyer might be forced to default on its 
own obligations, leading to a domino-effect collapse.154 
Markets serve as another pathway through which a failure can have 
network-wide effects.  In a domino model of financial contagion, where 
asset prices are assumed to be fixed, counterparty default is the mechanism 
by which the distress of one firm is transferred to another firm.155  In a 
market-based financial system, however, assets are often valued at their 
market prices.156  As a result, firms subject to margin calls may be forced to 
engage in fire sales, depressing prices, requiring more forced sales, and 
further depressing prices in a positive feedback loop, or “loss spiral.”157  
Because firms continually adjust their risk exposures in response to 
new information,158 systemic transmission of localized shocks need not 
even require that firms be linked through direct contracts or that they 
depress asset prices through fire sales.  Opaqueness, such as information 
uncertainty attributable to indirect holding of securities,159 can lead to the 
transmission of a local shock simply because it is not possible to identify 
the beneficial ownership of specific securities.  Not knowing which firms 
are exposed to securities that have become distressed, market participants 
may attribute those securities to all similarly situated firms.160  They may 
 
154. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 98. 
155. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 102. 
156. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1372. 
157. See Yadav, supra note 104.  Professor Charles Whitehead has pointed out that such 
feedback loops can paradoxically be exacerbated by uniform practices or rules.  See Charles K. 
Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326–27 (2011).  For example, 
the use by financial market participants of standard-form contracts increases the likelihood that 
they will respond to a common exogenous shock in lockstep.  See id.  Financial regulation can 
have similar effects.  Id.; see also Clifford De Souza & Mikhail Smirnov, Dynamic Leverage: A 
Contingent Claims Approach to Leverage for Capital Conservation, 31 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 25, 
28 (2004) (arguing that, in a bad market, short-term pressure to sell assets to raise cash for margin 
calls can lead to further mark-to-market losses for remaining assets, which triggers a whole new 
wave of selling, the process repeating itself until markets improve or the firm is wiped out, and 
referring to this process as a “Critical Liquidation Cycle”).  These spiraling events may well occur 
rapidly, within days.  See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability to Respond to 
Threats to the Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 8 
(2007) (statement of Richard Bookstaber, Author, A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge 
Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation) (observing the “tendency for markets to move 
rapidly into a crisis mode” and referring to this tendency, by analogy to engineering, as “tight 
coupling”). 
158. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 98, at 237–38 (describing how 
financial institutions continually adjust their behavior to the new market situations created by the 
actions of all financial institutions). 
159. Under the indirect-holding system, which applies to nearly all publicly traded securities, 
intermediaries, such as brokerage firms, hold interests in securities on behalf of investors.  See id. 
at 231. 
160. In economic terms, this can be seen as a variation of adverse selection.  See George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. 
ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (describing the agency costs that arise when sellers have better 
information regarding the quality of a good than buyers). 
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then become reluctant to extend credit to these firms based on “similarity” 
concerns.161 
Technological innovation has accelerated the speed with which local 
shocks can travel through the financial system.162  Recently developed 
trading technologies have greatly increased the speed of processing and 
trading on information.  High-frequency algorithmic trading systems rely 
on computerized quantitative models that execute thousands of orders per 
second with little or no human involvement.163  Because of the speed and 
automation with which high-frequency algorithmic trading occurs, events 
can move through the financial system too rapidly for there to be sufficient 
time or opportunity for regulators to respond.164 
Normal accident theory, in the context of the financial system, holds 
that even the most rigorously constructed ex ante regulatory measures 
cannot prevent the financial system from experiencing periodic crises.165  
Because the financial system possesses the features of both interactive 
complexity and tight coupling, it will, like all such systems, experience 
failures.166  Moreover, on occasion, it will fail in spectacular fashion as the 
system’s elements interact unexpectedly and with little delay.167 
2. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation.—Various scholars 
have observed that it takes a crisis to reform financial regulation.168  Ex 
ante—before a crisis emerges—proponents of enhanced financial oversight 
 
161. See supra note 106. 
162. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 98, at 214–15, 231–32. 
163. Carol L. Clark, Controlling Risk in a Lightning-Speed Trade Environment, CHI. FED 
LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.), Mar. 2010.  There are now numerous ways in which a large 
trade can be executed, allowing customers to choose how much human judgment is involved when 
executing such a trade.  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 14 (2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/ marketevents-report.pdf. 
164. See Clark, supra note 163 (explaining that the increased speed at which high-frequency 
trading occurs magnifies risks and presents a major issue for regulators). 
165. See Levitin, supra note 136, at 461–78 (reviewing various approaches to regulating 
systemic risk ex ante and concluding that such measures are incomplete).  Levitin concludes that 
the remaining risk must be addressed through ex post resolution that allows for definitive loss 
allocation.  Id. at 479–80.  Katharina Pistor attributes the “inherent instability” of the financial 
system to the combination of uncertainty and liquidity volatility.  Pistor, supra note 82, at 316. 
166. See PERROW, supra note 137, at 18 (asserting that accidents are inevitable in systems 
with characteristics such as interactive complexity and tight coupling). 
167. See Leonard & Howitt, supra note 142, at 18 (describing system failures as frequently 
the result of unexpected simultaneous interactions between subsystems). 
168. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of 
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 849–51 (1997); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020–24 (2012); Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial 
Services Industry, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5–6), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2273857; James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities 
Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 675 (2007). 
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confront a formidable asymmetry in political power between the financial 
industry and the general public.  Special interests oppose meaningful 
constraints on risk taking, and the general public has neither the means nor 
the interest to compete with them.169  Only in the wake of a severe 
economic downturn does public discontent tend to translate into regulatory 
reform.170 
The political influence of the financial services industry plays an 
important role in explaining the accumulation of risk in an economy.  
Public choice theories of regulation explain the production of regulation in 
terms of the various factors that influence the regulatory process.171  These 
factors include, among others, the industries being regulated and public 
sentiment.172  In the realm of finance, the financial services industry tends 
to dominate public policy during times of relative financial stability.173  
Because financial market participants are able to externalize significant 
social costs associated with their risk taking, it is in their interest to take on 
excessive risks and oppose regulatory efforts to curtail, or increase the costs 
of, their ability to do so.174 
Most of the time, the financial industry’s preference for lax regulation 
encounters only weak resistance.  Those who would benefit most from 
curbing excessive risk taking—namely, the general public—are widely 
dispersed, weakly organized, and enjoy only diffuse political power.175  In 
addition, commonly held behavioral biases tend to dampen popular concern 
over the buildup of risk in the economy when markets are stable.  For 
example, people are susceptible to “availability bias,” which reflects the 
tendency to be most aware of recent or vivid events.176  Availability bias 
 
169. See Park, supra note 168 (observing that economic downturns tend to cause public 
outrage which, in turn, leads to the passage of restrictive legislation). 
170. See Coffee, supra note 168, at 1021–22 (arguing that under normal circumstances 
“smaller, cohesive interest groups [will] predictably outperform larger, citizen-based ‘latent’ 
groups”). 
171. Park, supra note 168; see also BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND REGULATION 16–18 (2007) (“Public interest and private interest 
theories [of regulation] can be approached as accounts of what happens to make government 
actors pass detailed rules that govern the conduct of private actors.”). 
172. See id. at 674 (“[I]n light of the respective preferences of the public and the regulated, 
public choice theory might contend that principles-based enforcement actions are more likely 
when public influence is high and rulemaking is more likely when the regulated have more 
influence.”). 
173. See id. at 675 (arguing that industry players have more influence on securities regulation 
during boom times). 
174. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1375–76 (describing how financial market 
participants pursue self-interest due to the uninternalized costs associated with risk taking). 
175. Coffee, supra note 168, at 1021. 
176. Under the availability heuristic, people overestimate the frequency or likelihood of an 
event when examples of, or associations with, similar events are easily brought to mind.  Paul 
Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).  For 
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plays a role in explaining why individuals systematically underestimate the 
likelihood of rare but potentially catastrophic risks, a phenomenon 
sometimes referred to as “disaster myopia.”177  In the presence of 
availability bias, assessments of the risk of a destabilizing financial shock 
are likely to be understated.178  The problem is likely to be worst when 
markets are calm, allaying people’s fears of a financial crisis.179  It should 
therefore not be surprising that the special interests of the financial services 
industry tend to dominate public policy during periods of financial 
stability.180 
Financial crises provide an impetus for reform.  Popular sentiment 
against the financial industry, often in reaction to excesses that 
accompanied a preceding boom, weaken industry influence over 
regulators.181  As discontent galvanizes the public to demand reform, voters 
coalesce around so-called “political entrepreneurs” ready to provide it.182  
These shifts in the relative political influence of the financial sector and the 
general public are associated with increased financial regulatory 
oversight.183 
Crises produce a critical moment at which it becomes practical to 
reform financial regulation, but the regulation that follows may be hasty 
and ill-conceived.184  Sensitive to concerns about the shortcomings of 
 
example, people typically overestimate the divorce rate if they can quickly find examples of 
divorced friends. 
177. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 315–16 (2012) (identifying disaster myopia as a phenomenon that 
occurs “because of the underestimation of low-frequency economic shocks”); David J. Matthews, 
Ruined in a Conventional Way: Responses to Credit Ratings’ Role in Credit Crises, 29 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 245, 269–70 (2009) (defining disaster myopia as the “tendency for the subjective 
probability of a disaster to decline during long periods in which no disaster has occurred” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
178. Dallas, supra note 177, at 315. 
179. See Matthews, supra note 177, at 270 (noting that when financial conditions are stable, 
disaster myopia causes lenders “to reduce capital positions and relax lending criteria”). 
180. See Coffee, supra note 168, at 1021–22 (providing a theory explaining why Congress is 
usually only able to pass securities and financial reform legislation after a crisis and citing in 
particular the dominance of the financial services industry’s lobbying groups). 
181. Id. at 1020–22. 
182. Id. at 1021–22. 
183. See id. at 1036–37 (citing examples of public sentiment driving increased financial 
regulatory oversight). 
184. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY: 
UNDERSTANDING HOW SARBANES-OXLEY AFFECTS YOUR BUSINESS 20 (2007) (asserting that 
Congress’s enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “in such a haphazard fashion” resulted in a 
“mishmash of mandates” that made compliance with the Act more costly than was expected); 
HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE 
LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 16–18 (2006) (noting that one-sided testimony made by policy 
entrepreneurs “clearly contributed to Congress’s flawed policymaking” in its enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in 
Leisure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69, 70 (2006) (arguing that in enacting the Sarbanes-
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“bubble laws,”185 but frustrated by the practical constraints that face ex ante 
regulation posed by the financial industry, Professor John Coffee has 
concluded that it is better to enact even imperfect financial regulation in the 
wake of a crisis and rely on later corrective mechanisms to remedy its 
deficiencies than to miss the opportunity for reform entirely.186 
3. Unintended Consequences.—Even if complete ex ante financial 
regulation were possible, it would not necessarily be desirable because tight 
ex ante regulation can over-deter risk taking and lead to regulatory 
arbitrage.  When markets operate imperfectly, regulation can improve the 
functioning of the economy.187  Beyond correcting market failures, 
however, regulation can be counterproductive.  Regulators attempting to 
prevent every failure would deter even socially desirable risk taking. 
“Risk” is defined as the probability that an outcome will deviate from 
its expected outcome.188  A risky investment carries with it the possibility 
that it will yield a return that is unexpected.189  That surprise may be 
positive or negative.190  Through risk exposure, firms can generate outsized 
returns, but they must also expose themselves to lower-than-expected 
returns.191 
It is socially efficient for a firm to take on risk when the firm’s 
marginal return from assuming the risk exceeds the marginal social cost of 
 
Oxley Act, Congress “threw a bunch of ideas into a single basket and rushed it into law so that 
angry investors would blame somebody [else] for the stock market bubble’s bursting and the 
corporate governance scandals”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1526–27 (2005) (explaining that literature 
demonstrating that proposed mandates would be ineffective was available to legislators in the 
process of considering the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and either “went unnoticed or was ignored” 
resulting in “decisionmaking that . . . was, to put it mildly, less than optimal”). 
185. See Larry E. Ribstein, Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 79–83, 87–90 
(2003) (discussing the  “boom-bubble-bust-regulate cycle” in which financial market regulations 
take place, focusing specifically on the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act during a stock 
market panic and the Act’s resulting imperfections). 
186. Coffee, supra note 168, at 1034–35.  Professor Anna Gelpern has observed that the 
political economy of financial regulation may render any such imperfect financial regulation even 
more imperfect because, she suspects, “decisions on allocating between ex ante and ex post 
regulation are acutely political, and therefore biased in favor of ex ante regulation.  Who wants to 
tell the voters that they cannot protect them?” E-mail from Anna Gelpern, Professor of Law, Am. 
Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, to authors (June 28, 2013) (on file with authors). 
187. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 198 (arguing that market regulations are 
necessary because without them, as with the tragedy of the commons, no single market participant 
will have an incentive to reduce risk taking). 
188. ASWATH DAMODARAN, CORPORATE FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 151 (2d ed. 
2001). 
189. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1362. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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its doing so.192  In a perfectly competitive market, the expected return on an 
investment accurately reflects all the risks associated with it.193  In an earlier 
article, we argued that market participants tend to take on socially excessive 
levels of risk because a series of market failures obscures, or motivates 
them to ignore, the impact of their risk taking on systemic stability.194  As a 
result, financial firms trade off risk and return at socially suboptimal 
rates.195  In other words, for any given return, they take on too much risk. 
Complete ex ante regulation would tend to have the opposite effect.  
The more risk aversely financial regulation is designed, the greater the 
expected return on an investment must be to justify any given level of risk 
taking.  Extreme risk aversion would chill even socially beneficial risk 
taking.  Financial market participants would reject investment opportunities 
that, on average, would enhance social welfare.  At the limit, where 
regulation reflected infinite risk aversion, a firm would behave as if it were 
certain that any risk it assumed would produce the worst possible outcome.  
In such circumstances, firms would invest only in opportunities with 
expected returns that dominated worst-case scenarios.  Under less extreme 
scenarios, regulation might still induce financial market participants to 
behave more risk aversely than would be socially desirable.  The more 
stringent the regulatory regime, the more likely that firms would take on too 
little risk.  The result of any overdeterrence arising from ex ante regulation 
would be a decline in the economy’s potential growth rate.196 
Another danger of attempting to impose complete ex ante financial 
regulation is that it is likely to lead to circumvention.  In a law-related 
system, any change in the law causes other elements in the system to 
respond.197  People can react to restrictive laws either by complying or by 
altering their behavior.198  Restrictive laws often give rise to avoidance.199  
One way that people remove themselves from the law’s reach is through 
regulatory arbitrage.  Regulatory arbitrage is the process by which firms 
 
192. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 113, at 348–49 (noting that under cost–
benefit analysis efficiency is determined by “balancing the marginal costs of an action against the 
marginal benefits of that action”). 
193. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1363. 
194. Id. at 1352. 
195. See id. at 1381–82 (arguing that without government regulation aimed at protecting 
social welfare “market participants would rationally trade off risk and return, and financial crises 
would serve as mechanisms for punishing excessive risk taking”). 
196. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Regulation in the Amoral Bazaar, 128 S. AFR. L.J. 
253, 271 & n.77 (2011) (“Doctrinal conceptualism sometimes stands in the way . . . .”). 
197. See Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611, 612 (2011) 
(noting that “[t]he act of making a law alters the state of affairs to which the law will apply—only 
after the law is enacted and in a manner only that law could have caused”). 
198. Id. (asserting that “laws change behavior” and that the law “cannot fully control the 
behavioral changes . . . unleash[ed]”). 
199. Id. 
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obtain differential treatment of substantively similar activities.200  The 
phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage is especially evident in the financial 
regulatory arena, where “sophisticated and resourceful actors pair with 
complex law to produce at times maddening and costly games of regulatory 
cat-and-mouse.”201 
Regulatory arbitrage has been an important force behind the growth of 
shadow banking.202  Many shadow-banking activities aim to circumvent 
bank capital requirements, thereby achieving higher leverage than is 
permissible for traditional banks.203  This behavior was particularly notable 
in the years preceding the Financial Crisis.204 
Given the mobility of financial capital, the problem of regulatory 
circumvention extends beyond jurisdictional boundaries.  International 
differences in regulatory policies affect the competitiveness of financial 
firms.205  When a jurisdiction unilaterally imposes costly regulations on its 
financial sector, it may be placing local firms at a competitive 
disadvantage.206  The regulations effectively act as a negative shock to 
competitiveness that can lead to the flow of capital to foreign jurisdictions 
with less stringent regulations.207  Financial globalization thus poses a 
“regulator[y] dilemma” for regulators who would like to benefit from 
international exchange but are wary of compromising their financial 
systems.208 
To summarize, ex ante financial regulation, whereby regulators seek to 
prevent financial crises from materializing, is at best a partial solution to 
 
200. Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. 
L. 211, 227 (1997); see also Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 227, 229 
(2010) (providing a broader definition of regulatory arbitrage). 
201. Buell, supra note 197. 
202. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 626 
(2012) (noting that regulatory arbitrage was a “contributing factor to the emergence of shadow 
banking”). 
203. See Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15730, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w15730 (finding that banks used shadow banking to reduce their capital requirements on their 
balance sheet); Guillermo Ordonez, Sustainable Shadow Banking 2, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 19022, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19022 
(explaining that banks used shadow banking “to go around regulations” including capital 
requirement regulations). 
204. See Ordonez, supra note 203 (“In the years leading to the 2007-09 financial crisis in the 
United States, banks increasingly devised instruments to get around capital requirements, moving 
away from traditional banking into so called shadow banking . . . .”). 
205. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination 
of Banking Regulations, 43 INT’L ORG. 323, 326–27 (1989) (observing that a country’s domestic 
regulatory policies have a direct impact on the competitiveness of their financial firms versus 
those in other countries). 
206. Id. 
207. See id. at 327 (using bank capital to illustrate this phenomenon). 
208. Id. at 324, 326–27. 
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addressing systemic risk.  Systemic risk must also be targeted ex post, after 
events that could trigger financial crises have occurred, because complete 
ex ante regulation is both impossible and unrealistic.  Moreover, pursuing 
ex ante regulation as the only, or even primary, regulatory strategy aimed at 
controlling systemic risk would be inefficient.  Ex post financial regulation 
should complement ex ante financial regulation to further the goals of 
systemic efficiency and stability. 
IV. Regulating the Financial System Ex Post 
Our aim in this Part is to illustrate how ex post financial regulation can 
be used as a tool for mitigating the impact of a failure within the financial 
system.  We stress that such ex post financial regulatory measures do not 
have to be ad hoc.209  They can be designed and established before any 
failure occurs.  What distinguishes ex post solutions from ex ante solutions 
is not the point in time at which they are adopted but rather the point in time 
at which they are directed. 
Ex post financial regulation complements ex ante measures in at least 
three ways.  Because normal accident theory teaches us that crises are 
bound to occur in complex, tightly-coupled systems, such as the financial 
system,210 ex post regulation is needed to address those inevitable failures.  
Because public choice theory teaches us that the financial industry will 
inhibit regulatory efforts to curb excessive risk taking during times of 
economic stability,211 ex post regulation is needed to respond to the 
consequences of such risk taking.  And because ex ante regulation can over-
deter productive risk taking and provoke regulatory arbitrage,212 ex post 
regulation is needed to reduce the danger that policy makers, in their efforts 
to avert the next financial crisis, will overregulate financial markets. 
A. Ex Post Regulatory Strategies 
Systems analysis offers two types of defensive strategies against the 
spread of financial failures.  The first approach is to prevent the failures 
from occurring in the first place.213  The second is to act on the system’s 
elements and interconnections in order to mitigate the systemic 
consequences of a failure should it nonetheless occur.214  Ex post regulatory 
strategies would focus on the second type of defensive strategy. 
 
209. See Levitin, supra note 136, at 491 (observing that ex post regulation can either be done 
ad hoc or institutionalized). 
210. See supra notes 142–54 and accompanying text. 
211. See supra notes 115, 170–80 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra notes 188–201 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
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1. Financial Safety Nets.—Ultimately, supporting the financial system 
involves the use of some form of financial safety net.  By “financial safety 
net,” we mean the authority of a government or other publicly governed 
body, in the case of financial firms, to allocate the losses of an illiquid or 
insolvent215 firm to itself and, in the case of financial markets, to stabilize 
supply and demand imbalances.  A circus safety net is a useful metaphor for 
ex post financial regulation that targets the elements of the financial system.  
The direct purpose of the safety net is to protect acrobats from sustaining 
serious injury.216  The safety net also has an indirect, less immediate 
purpose.  That purpose is to make it “economically rational for circus 
acrobats to undertake difficult, but do-able stunts in which the danger of a 
spectacular fall seems very real.”217  The term “do-able” underscores the 
point that the circus safety net is intended to encourage prudent, not 
reckless, risk taking on the part of the performers.218 
Like a circus safety net, a financial safety net has the immediate 
purpose of protecting against what might otherwise be a critical fall.  More 
broadly, financial safety nets can protect the financial system as a whole by 
providing financial market participants with protection against the risk that 
their counterparties will default (in the case of financial firm safety nets) or 
against the risk that markets collapse (in the case of financial market safety 
nets).219  Safety nets constitute an ex post regulatory strategy because their 
primary goal is not to deter harmful conduct, which is likely to have already 
taken place, but to mitigate the systemic consequences of financial failures 
once they have begun.  Even one firm’s failure, if it is systemically 
significant, can result in a cascade of related failures.220  Markets that begin 
failing by ceasing to operate smoothly can simultaneously compromise 
multiple financial firms that participate in them.221  Governmental safety 
nets may, of course, encourage moral hazard—a willingness on the part of 
 
215. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 
474–75 (2010) (discussing how the capital structure of certain financial firms can leave them 
vulnerable to illiquidity or insolvency); Levitin, supra note 136, at 481, 491, 513 (discussing the 
role of the government in allocating losses through bankruptcy or through bailouts). 
216. Edward J. Kane, Financial Safety Nets: Reconstructing and Modeling a Policymaking 
Metaphor 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8224, 2001), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8224. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Financial 
Regulation 15 CHAP. L. REV. 257, 263–65 (2011) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post]. 
220. Jean Helwege, Financial Firm Bankruptcy and Systemic Risk, 20 INT’L FIN. MKTS., 
INSTS. & MONEY 1, 5 (2010). 
221. See Viral V. Acharya et al., Market Failures and Regulatory Failures: Lessons from Past 
and Present Financial Crises 20 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 264, 2011), 
available at http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2011/02/08/4377.market.regulatory.failures 
.lessons.gfc/ (arguing that a failure of one financial institution can have ripple effects throughout 
the financial market and that these ripple effects have a broader effect on the economy). 
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individuals to engage in imprudent high-wire acts because they believe that 
they will be rescued if they fall.222  Nevertheless, as we discuss in subpart 
IV(B) below, we believe that such concerns can be managed effectively. 
a. Firms.—Firm financial safety nets can transfer losses from a 
firm’s stakeholders to a government or other publicly governed body.223  
Importantly, they do so outside the bankruptcy system.224  Indeed, this is 
their raison d’être.  Bankruptcy law embodies its own framework in the 
event of liquidation or reorganization for determining how the resulting 
losses should be distributed.225 
Bankruptcy has long been used as a resolution system for nonbank 
firms, including nonbank financial firms.226  In many cases, bankruptcy is 
an effective regime for addressing the difficulties confronting such firms.227  
There are circumstances, however, in which regulators might prefer to opt 
out of the bankruptcy resolution process.  One of these is where a financial 
firm is “too big to fail” (TBTF).  TBTF firms are those whose failure 
pursuant to predetermined default schemes for loss allocation could 
reasonably be expected to “trigger socially unacceptable macroeconomic 
consequences.”228  The status of a financial institution as TBTF depends not 
on its legal characterization but rather on whether it is systemically 
important.  A TBTF firm can be a critical financial intermediary, like a 
bank, or another type of organization, such as a hedge fund, with substantial 
exposure to other market participants.229  TBTF status “implicitly [is] a 
proxy for market consequences.”230  A financial firm is thus a suitable 
candidate for safety-net protection if regulators believe that it is TBTF. 
 
222. See Jin Cao & Gerhard Illing, Regulation of Systemic Liquidity Risk, 24 FIN. MKTS. & 
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 31, 36–40 (2010) (“[F]ree-riding incentives encourage excessive risk 
taking.”). 
223. See infra notes 238–39 and accompanying text. 
224. Id. 
225. Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority 
and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1013–14 (1987). 
226. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 215, at 477–83 (asserting that bankruptcy is 
“surprisingly well-designed to handle the failures of nonbank financial firms” and using the 
Drexel Burnham and Lehman Brothers bankruptcies as examples). 
227. Professors Kenneth Ayotte and David Skeel would subject the vast majority of 
bankruptcy-eligible financial firms to the bankruptcy process.  Id. at 471.  While they 
acknowledge that “the most significant limitation of bankruptcy [is] that it does not address 
systemic risk concerns,” they consider worries about the systemic repercussions of bankruptcy to 
be overstated.  Id. at 483.  In cases in which regulators conclude that systemic risk warrants 
intervention, Ayotte and Skeel favor an “intermediate” strategy in which the firm files for 
bankruptcy protection and the government selectively guarantees liabilities.  Id. at 491. 
228. Levitin, supra note 136, at 452. 
229. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 202. 
230. Id. 
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The failure of a TBTF firm can generate systemic consequences 
through multiple channels.  In order to be TBTF, a firm must be linked to 
other financial firms, either through direct contractual relationships or 
through its potential to affect markets.231  Default by a TBTF firm on its 
contractual obligations raises the possibility that its counterparties will be 
adversely affected in such a way that they, too, default on their contractual 
obligations, leading to a domino-effect collapse.232  In addition, a TBTF 
firm that is in distress may be forced to sell financial assets, placing 
downward pressure on the prices of those assets.233  For example, “mark-to-
market” or “fair value” accounting rules may require investors to adjust the 
accounting value of certain securities holdings to their current market 
prices.234  As those holdings decline in value, the initial distress of the 
TBTF firm can spread as it has to sell other assets to meet contractual or 
regulatory obligations that depend on its financial condition.235  Finally, the 
TBTF firm’s distress can spill over to other institutions by reducing 
financial market confidence in the financial condition of other, similarly 
situated firms.236 
Safety nets can help protect financial firms that are in distress.  When 
regulators deem a distressed firm to be TBTF, the government, for example, 
in its capacity as lender of last resort, can choose to absorb the firm’s losses 
rather than allow it to experience bankruptcy.237  By protecting TBTF 
financial firms, which are integral elements of the financial system, 
financial safety nets can mitigate the spread of a financial crisis. 
The design of financial-firm safety nets can occur on a purely ad hoc 
basis, whereby the safety nets are implemented as a response to what 
regulators perceive as a failing TBTF firm.  The bailouts of Bear Stearns, 
AIG, and Citigroup in response to the unfolding of the Financial Crisis fit 
this description.238  Because ad hoc approaches are not initiated until a 
potential failure is identified, however, they may arise too late to minimize 
systemic effects or without adequate time for regulators to fully consider 
how to optimize their design. 
 
231. See Levitin, supra note 136, at 452 (stating that “the concern when a TBTF firm fails is 
to protect a particular set of counterparties” in order to protect against “spillovers that have direct 
or second-order macroeconomic effects”). 
232. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
234. De Souza & Smirnov, supra note 157. 
235. Whitehead, supra note 157, at 326–27. 
236. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
237. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1376. 
238. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 248 (using Bear Stearns as an example of a 
safety net that occurred on an ad hoc basis); Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by 
Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 498 (2009) 
(describing the additional government resources needed to rescue AIG as “showing the perils of 
ad hoc bailout”). 
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These concerns could be addressed by institutionalizing safety nets 
through a delegation of bailout authority to a governmental body charged 
with providing guarantees, making loans, or investing directly in distressed 
TBTF firms.239  Institutionalizing a safety net in this way would allow it to 
be designed in advance for the purpose of supporting firms pursuant to 
predetermined criteria.  The safety net’s sources of funding could also be 
specified.  Safety nets would be activated only contingently, however—
presumably around the same time that a looming crisis would make it 
politically feasible to implement. 
The U.S. currently has no formal safety net mechanism for rescuing 
TBTF firms.  The Department of the Treasury needs congressional approval 
to conduct bailouts.240  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has the authority to resolve a failing 
financial firm but only through liquidation.241  The Federal Reserve Bank 
(Federal Reserve) also is limited in its capacity to address systemic risk.  
Historically, the Federal Reserve has had the authority to act as a lender of 
last resort to financial institutions in “unusual and exigent circumstances,” 
under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, but the Dodd-Frank Act 
drastically limited its authority to make emergency loans under Section 
13(3).242  The Act amended Section 13(3) to require the Federal Reserve to 
consult with and receive approval from the Secretary of the Treasury to 
ensure that any emergency lending is designed to provide liquidity to 
markets and not to aid a financially failing firm.243  Perversely, Dodd-
Frank’s limitation has actually increased the risk that an important financial 
firm will collapse, with systemic consequences.244 
b. Markets.—While providing safety nets for firms addresses 
contagion that follows a domino model, it is an inadequate policy response 
to crises that arise in markets.  When markets face a common risk factor, 
the rescue of one or even a few financial firms will do little to support other 
similarly situated firms.  Outside the context of the domino model of 
contagion, the main transmission mechanism for systemic risk is not the 
default of a firm’s counterparties.  It is a negative shock to one or more 
 
239. Levitin, supra note 136, at 491. 
240. Id. at 493. 
241. Id. at 487. 
242. Id. at 495, 498 n.265. 
243. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1101(a)(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113–15 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). 
244. See Dino Falaschetti, Fred Karlinsky & Richard Fidei, Dodd-Frank and Board 
Governance: New Political-Legal Risks to Monetary Policy and Business Judgments?, 29 
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 5 (2010) (arguing that the increased accountability created 
by financial reforms can account for a source of risks by “empower[ing] one set of interests (e.g., 
shareholders, borrowers) to gain from others’ losses (e.g., bondholders, lenders)”). 
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markets that affects many firms.245  Mitigating systemic risk transmission 
under these circumstances is most directly accomplished by stabilizing the 
prices of distressed financial assets using a safety net for markets.246 
In retrospect, the collapse of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
market was at least as important a factor in causing the Financial Crisis as 
the U.S. Government’s refusal to rescue Lehman Brothers in 2008.247  
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.248  It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine empirically the extent to which 
Lehman’s bankruptcy led to the financial market turmoil that ensued 
because Lehman’s bankruptcy occurred contemporaneously with numerous 
other disruptive financial events.249  The confluence of such shocks around 
the same time makes it difficult to identify the relationship between 
Lehman’s failure and the Financial Crisis. 
On the one hand, the systemic impact of Lehman’s failure appears to 
have been powerful.  The day after Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the 
Reserve Primary Fund, which held Lehman debt, announced that it had 
“broken the buck”—only the second time in history that a money-market 
fund’s share value had fallen below a dollar.250  Lehman’s bankruptcy also 
affected the credit-default-swap market, as there was a substantial amount 
of credit-default protection written against Lehman’s debt.251  On the other 
hand, the systemic importance of Lehman’s failure should not be 
overstated.  Lehman’s bankruptcy occurred during a time when there were 
good reasons for market participants to question the solvency of a number 
of large financial firms, not because of their exposure to Lehman, but 
because they were exposed to the MBS market. 
 
245. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1372 (explaining that, aside from the domino 
model of contagion, “[m]arkets serve as another mechanism through which shocks can have 
network-wide effects”). 
246. Id. at 1404–05 (arguing that a market liquidity provider of last resort can attempt to 
“stabilize financial markets in times of panic, when securities prices have fallen below their 
intrinsic values” by “purchasing market securities at prices that are below their intrinsic values but 
above their then-current prices”). 
247. See Levitin, supra note 136, at 460–61 (“Common shocks to sectors of the economy can 
result in the mass failure of individual firms, thereby producing broader economic harm.”); see 
also Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1359–60 (citing the failure of the MBS market as a 
major cause of the Financial Crisis). 
248. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all 
&_r=0. 
249. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1359–61 (describing how financial events 
such as the collapse of the MBS market contributed to the Financial Crisis). 
250. Diana B. Henriques, Money Market Fund Says Customers Could Lose Money, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/17fund.html?_r=0. 
251. See Mary Williams Walsh, Insurance on Lehman Debt Is the Industry’s Next Test, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/business/11credit.html (discussing the 
post-bankruptcy implications of the “huge value of credit-default swaps on Lehman Brothers”). 
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MBS were a product of the alchemy that transformed individually 
risky mortgages into debt instruments, the senior tranches of which were 
considered by rating agencies to be of the highest credit quality.252  When 
the value of residential real estate declined sharply, borrowers defaulted on 
their mortgages at unanticipated rates.253  Those defaults, particularly in the 
subprime mortgage market, in turn caused the defaults or downgrades of 
significant amounts of MBS.254  Investors responded by losing confidence 
in and withdrawing from MBS and other related markets.255  As a result, 
prices of MBS fell below their intrinsic value (the present value of the 
expected cash flows of the mortgage loans backing them).256  The collapse 
of the MBS market required financial firms to write down the value of their 
MBS holdings, impairing their balance sheets and causing them to appear 
less financially sound.257  Concerns arose with respect to all financial firms 
exposed to MBS.  Thus, to a considerable degree, it was exposure to the 
MBS market generally that undermined confidence in financial firms during 
the Financial Crisis. 
A liquidity provider of last resort (a market liquidity provider) can 
serve as a safety net for financial markets.  The objective of a market 
liquidity provider would be twofold: ex ante, to reduce the likelihood that 
investors in financial markets panic;258 and ex post, “to stabilize financial 
markets to which financial firms are commonly exposed in times of panic, 
when securities prices have fallen below their intrinsic values.”259  A market 
liquidity provider could support panicked markets by purchasing market 
 
252. See William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 424 (2010) (noting that the senior tranches of mortgage pools were 
rated AAA by the rating agencies). 
253. Id. at 426. 
254. Levitin, supra note 136, at 461. 
255. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 115, at 378–79. 
256. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-247, NATIONAL CREDIT UNION 
ADMINISTRATION: EARLIER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO BETTER ADDRESS TROUBLED CREDIT 
UNIONS 24 (2012). 
257. Levitin, supra note 136, at 460–61. 
258. Cf. William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Remarks at the New York Bankers Association’s 2013 Annual Meeting & Economic Forum: 
Fixing Wholesale Funding to Build a More Stable Financial System (Feb. 1, 2013) (transcript 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud130201.html) (describing 
the “two key functions performed by a lender of last resort,” the first being “to reduce the risk of a 
financial panic beginning in the first place” and the second being “to prevent the fire sale of 
assets . . . from spreading contagion across the [financial] system and disrupting the provision of 
credit to the economy”). 
259. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1405.  The Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
commonly known as TARP, was initially intended to promote financial stability by allowing the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury to purchase troubled assets from financial firms but was replaced 
by programs under which the Treasury would invest directly in the equity of financial firms and 
guarantee new debt issuances.  See Dinara Bayazitova & Anil Shivdasani, Assessing TARP, 25 
REV. FIN. STUD. 377, 380–82 (2012) (constructing a timeline of events related to TARP). 
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securities at prices that are below their intrinsic values but above their then-
current prices.260  A market liquidity provider could also try to stabilize 
markets by entering into derivatives contracts to take on those risks that 
markets are not hedging efficiently.261 
We have pointed out the ad hoc nature of the regulatory measures that 
were used to support financial firms during the Financial Crisis.262  The 
regulatory response to the Financial Crisis in financial markets was similar 
in approach.  The Federal Reserve acted as a market liquidity provider in 
several limited contexts.  The largest liquidity program created by the 
Federal Reserve during that time was its MBS purchase program.263  The 
MBS that the Federal Reserve purchased were guaranteed by the two GSEs 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
as well as by Ginnie Mae, the U.S. Government-owned corporation 
within the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  The 
program was set up with an initial limit of $500 billion but was later 
expanded to $1.25 trillion.  It expired on March 31, 2010.  The 
Federal Reserve also created a program to buy GSE debt—initially 
up to $100 billion and later expanded to $200 billion—and a 
program to purchase $300 billion of medium-term Treasury 
securities.  The Federal Reserve’s MBS purchases were in addition 
to an earlier-announced MBS purchase program by the Treasury.264 
Beginning in September 2012, the Federal Reserve further increased 
“policy accommodation by purchasing additional [MBS] at a pace of $40 
billion per month.”265  Additionally, the Federal Reserve currently 
“purchases MBS under a policy announced on September 21, 2011, in 
which principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency 
MBS are reinvested in agency MBS.”266 
 
260. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1405.  To induce holders of securities to sell 
them at such prices, the market liquidity provider could employ flexible pricing approaches such 
as those used in structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain value.  
Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008: 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 94, 99 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & 
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr. eds., 2010). 
261. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1405.  For example, in an effort to encourage 
private entities to purchase toxic assets from banks, the Treasury Department proposed 
guaranteeing a floor value of these troubled assets.  Floyd Norris, U.S. Bailout to Rely in Part on 
Private Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/business/09 
bailout.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
262. See supra text accompanying notes 239–40. 
263. Johannes Stroebel & John B. Taylor, Estimated Impact of the Federal Reserve’s 
Mortgage-Backed Securities Program, 8 INT’L J. OF CENT. BANKING 1, 1 (2012). 
264. Id. at 1–2. 
265. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm. 
266. Open Market Operations, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www 
.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_openmarketops.htm (last updated June 3, 2013). 
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The Federal Reserve further undertook to support the consumer asset-
backed securities (ABS) market through the Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility (TALF).267  ABS are securities similar to MBS but 
collateralized by nonmortgage loans, such as automobile, credit card, and 
student loan receivables.268  The ABS markets historically have funded a 
substantial share of credit to consumers and businesses.269  Concerned that 
“continued disruption of [the ABS] markets could significantly limit the 
availability of credit to households and . . . businesses and thereby 
contribute to further weakening of U.S. economic activity,” the Federal 
Reserve used TALF to provide nonrecourse funding to borrowers willing to 
issue new ABS.270 
Confronted by strains in the commercial paper market, on which 
businesses rely heavily for short-term funding, the Federal Reserve 
established the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to provide 
liquidity to U.S. issuers of commercial paper in the event that they could 
not obtain it privately.271  The CPFF effectively extended access to the 
Federal Reserve’s discount window, a lending facility traditionally 
available only to depository institutions, to issuers of commercial paper.272 
The Federal Reserve thus responded to the Financial Crisis by 
implementing a number of newly created programs, including those 
described above, designed to support liquidity in financial markets.  These 
programs led to a substantial expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet.273  In addition, the Federal Reserve has used open market 
operations—an activity traditionally used by it to implement monetary 
policy—to ease credit market conditions.274 
The government’s response to the Financial Crisis is widely perceived 
to have averted an even deeper recession or outright depression.275  
 
267. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm. 
268. See id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility, 17 
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 25, 25 (2011). 
272. Id. 
273. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Nat’l Press Club Luncheon, 
Nat’l Press Club, Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve Policies to Ease Credit and Their 
Implications for the Fed’s Balance Sheet (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20090218a.htm. 
274. Open Market Operations, supra note 266. 
275. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder & Mark Zandi, Stimulus Worked, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2010, at 
14, 14 (“The Great Recession in the United States gave way to recovery as quickly as it did largely 
because of the unprecedented response by monetary and fiscal policymakers.”); Paul Krugman, 
Op-Ed., Averting the Worst, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/ 
10/opinion/10krugman.html (crediting the financial bailout and economic stimulus with 
preventing another Great Depression); Deborah Solomon, U.S. Economy Gets Lift from Stimulus, 
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Contemporaneously with the MBS purchase program, mortgage interest 
rate spreads over U.S. Treasuries began declining, and, by July 2009, they 
had returned to slightly below their long-run average.276  Evidence is also 
consistent with the view that the TALF had a positive effect on the 
consumer ABS markets.  In 2009, issuance of consumer ABS gradually 
began rising and spreads on AAA-rated credit card ABS had significantly 
narrowed.277  The CPFF also appears to have helped stabilize the 
commercial paper market.278  Interest rate spreads between high-quality 
commercial paper and comparable U.S. Treasuries spiked just prior to 
operation of the program, then gradually moderated and eventually returned 
to normal levels.279  These correlations, although they do not establish a 
causal link between the government’s market interventions and easing 
credit conditions, are consistent with the view that the programs were 
effective.280 
On the other hand, the government’s response to the Financial Crisis 
was not as well-conceived or prompt as it might have been.  It consisted 
largely of a series of crisis-driven deals.  With the exception of its 
traditional tool of open market operations, each of the foregoing policy 
responses was adopted after the market that the government was seeking to 
support had effectively collapsed.281  Even the Federal Reserve’s open 
market operations did not, at the inception of the Financial Crisis, constitute 
an existing safety-net mechanism for financial markets because government 
purchases of securities in the open market had historically been aimed at 
stimulating the economy, not at supporting the functioning of credit 
markets.282  If a market liquidity provider had existed at the outset of the 
Financial Crisis, it could have stepped in as credit conditions began to 
deteriorate to strategically purchase or hedge sufficient quantities of 
 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125185379218478087.html#article 
Tabs%3Darticle (noting that economists agreed that U.S. Government spending had turned the 
recession around). 
276. Stroebel & Taylor, supra note 263, at 2. 
277. William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Remarks at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Pension Real Estate 
Association’s Public-Private Investment Program Summit, New York City: A Preliminary 
Assessment of the TALF (June 4, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/news 
events/speeches/2009/dud090604.html). 
278. Adrian et al., supra note 271, at 35, 36 chart 7. 
279. Id. at 36, 37 chart 9. 
280. See Stroebel & Taylor, supra note 263, at 3‒7 (contending that it is important to 
determine whether such statements can be supported by econometric analysis that controls for 
nongovernmental influences on markets). 
281. Cf. Dudley, supra note 258 (noting that government interventions were post hoc, 
emergency actions taken in response to the financial crisis). 
282. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
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securities to stabilize the MBS and ABS markets, thereby mitigating the 
credit meltdown that ultimately impacted the real economy.283 
As in the case of firm safety nets, institutionalizing financial market 
safety nets ahead of another financial crisis would permit their design to be 
developed with the benefit of careful analysis.  It would also provide a 
source of preexisting authority, as well as political legitimacy, to market 
liquidity providers.  Finally, regulators could act swiftly and decisively in 
response to market breakdowns. 
2. Disrupting Transmission Chains.—The failure of any one element 
of a system will be systemically significant to the extent that such failure is 
transmitted, directly or indirectly, to other elements of the system.284  
Linkages among the elements of a system make a system fragile.285  An ex 
post paradigm for financial regulation should thus address systemic risk not 
only by providing safety nets for the elements of a system, but also by 
seeking to disrupt the mechanisms by which systemic risk travels. 
As we explained in subpart III(B), the most dangerous systems—the 
ones that are prone to catastrophic failures—are systems that possess both 
interactive complexity and tight coupling.  These types of systems 
obfuscate risk and present little opportunity for intervention following a 
local shock.286  Systems that possess neither, or only one of, the foregoing 
features do not pose the same level of systemic risk.  A system that is 
interactively complex but only loosely coupled, for example, is likely to 
produce unpredictable interactions among its elements because of the 
system’s interactive complexity.287  However, the ultimate damage to such a 
system from a failure at the level of its elements is likely to be manageable 
because loose coupling presents opportunities for early intervention.288  A 
system that is tightly coupled but not interactively complex should be 
 
283. Cf. Dudley, supra note 258 (observing that although the Federal Reserve’s market 
liquidity facilities implemented during the Financial Crisis “ultimately stabilized funding markets 
and crowded back in private funds. . . .  They were an emergency response, not a sustainable, 
long-term solution”). 
284. John Downer, When Failure Is an Option: Redundancy, Reliability, and Regulation in 
Complex Technical Systems 13 (Ctr. for Analysis of Risk & Regulation at the London Sch. of 
Econ. & Political Sci., Discussion Paper No. 53, 2009), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/ 
researchAndExpertise/units/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper53.pdf (asserting that the majority of fatal 
accidents occur “where the failure of one element propagates to others”). 
285. See, e.g., supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
287. See PERROW, supra note 137, at 160–61 (describing universities as being loosely 
coupled but possessing interactive complexity that can cause their elements to “interact in 
unexpected ways”). 
288. See id. at 160–63 (asserting that in universities, which are interactively complex but 
loosely coupled, it is unlikely that failure of an element of the system will cause the system to fail 
because there is “ample slack to limit the impact” of the element’s failure and “plenty of time for 
recovery”). 
ANABTAWI(SCHWARCZ).FINAL.RESUBMIT.OC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2013  1:19 PM 
2013] Regulating Ex Post 113 
susceptible to stabilization because its elements interact in ways that are 
predictable.289  When regulators understand the means by which systemic 
risk is transmitted, they can intervene to disrupt it.  Indeed, they may even 
be able to design safety mechanisms into the system. 
We also showed in subpart III(B) that the financial system is a high-
risk system because it is both interactively complex and tightly coupled.  As 
such, the financial system is bound to experience “normal” accidents.290  
The ex post approaches we advance in this section would aim to reduce the 
breadth and depth of the consequences of financial crises.  In our preceding 
discussion of safety nets, we considered ex post regulatory strategies that 
operated on the elements of the financial system.  Here, we describe 
strategies that are applicable to the interconnections among those elements.  
These strategies involve reducing the interactive complexity of the financial 
system or reducing the tight coupling among the financial system’s 
elements. 
a. Reducing Interactive Complexity.—Ex post strategies for reducing 
interactive complexity would focus on resolution mechanisms that simplify 
the system in ways that reduce systemic consequences.  In the context of 
financial regulation, this can be illustrated by bankruptcy law and related 
approaches to resolving complex capital structures of troubled firms.291  In 
each case, the goal would be to restructure the troubled firm’s debt in order 
to reduce the breadth and depth of the consequences of a default.  Firms can 
find themselves in financial trouble for two reasons: their businesses are 
inherently unprofitable or they have taken on too much debt (or other 
liabilities).292  In the former case, bankruptcy law generally provides a 
highly simplified resolution mechanism—liquidating the firm by selling its 
assets for cash and using the cash to pay down creditors according to the 
priorities of their claims.293  Although liquidation has consequences, they 
 
289. See id. at 524–26 (noting that when failures occur, systems that lack interactive 
complexity, in other words, are linear, and are tightly coupled do “not interact in unexpected and 
incomprehensible ways, but in expected and visible ways”). 
290. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
291. These resolution mechanisms apply mainly to firms but do not apply directly to markets. 
Schwarcz, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 219, at 268. 
292. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Essay, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 
573, 580 (1998).  Professor Baird contrasts a firm that is “troubled because it cannot succeed in 
the marketplace, since competitors produce a better product at a lower cost,” with a firm that is 
“distressed because it cannot generate sufficient revenue to pay its debts.”  Id.  The first kind of 
distress “exists regardless of a firm’s capital structure.”  Id.  The second kind of distress is due to 
the firm’s poor capital structure: “the firm’s income is not enough to pay back what it has 
borrowed.”  Id. 
293. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 721–727 (2012) (providing this type of liquidation scheme). 
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are, for an inherently unprofitable firm, generally less harmful than the 
consequences of trying to indefinitely subsidize a failing business.294 
In the case of an inherently profitable firm that has taken on too much 
debt, however, the harmful consequences of liquidation—which not only 
would reduce jobs and destroy local communities, but also might trigger a 
systemic chain of defaults among unpaid creditors and suppliers—may well 
exceed those of a debt restructuring that returns the firm to a viable capital 
structure.295  Returning the firm to a viable capital structure also helps 
maintain financial market confidence by reducing counterparty risk.296 
To that end, firms could attempt to restructure their debts by 
negotiation, without invoking bankruptcy law.  However, as explained 
below, the interactive complexity of most firms would be difficult to 
address without the benefit of bankruptcy law.  This interactive complexity 
results from the web of contracts between the troubled firm and its 
creditors.  Many firms, and certainly most public firms, have numerous 
contracts with third parties, creating a multitude of obligations between the 
firm and those parties. 
A troubled firm could attempt to restructure those obligations by 
negotiation alone, but that often is impractical.  Not only are there too many 
contracts, but contracts—especially debt contracts—with multiple third 
parties typically require unanimity among those parties before essential 
provisions (such as principal due, interest rate, and payment maturities) 
may be changed.297  The unanimity requirement can motivate one or more 
creditors to strategically hold out from agreeing to reasonable changes.298  
The holdouts hope that they either “will receive full payment of their claims 
or that the imperative of other creditors to settle will persuade those 
creditors to allocate the holdouts more than their fair share of the 
settlement.”299  Moreover, the problem is exacerbated because parties to a 
 
294. See Baird, supra note 292, at 598 (theorizing that “subsidies for failed enterprises” may 
be more costly than current liquidation laws); id. at 580 (“Keeping a bad restaurant in business 
postpones the inevitable and delays a desirable shift of labor and capital to somewhere the inputs 
can be put to better use.”). 
295. See Levitin, supra note 136, at 483 (noting that “[r]esolution of a TBTF firm in a 
bankruptcy system could produce the very harms sought to be avoided”); cf. id. at 478 (observing 
that “resolution system design is central to financial crisis management because its loss allocation 
function plays a critical role in restoring market confidence”). 
296. Cf. id. at 478–79 (“Resolution system design is also critical for dealing with financial 
failure contagion.  Successful resolution systems can limit financial failure contagion because they 
let the market see the end of the financial domino chain, and thus make clear which firms are 
sound, which creates the confidence necessary for investing.”). 
297. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, 
2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 95, 99 (2012) (observing that “[f]inancing agreements often require 
unanimous consent of the parties to make these types of changes”). 
298. Id. at 98. 
299. Id.  A holdout may also hope that other creditors will purchase the holdout’s claim.  Id. 
at 98 n.17. 
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given contract who otherwise may be unanimously prepared to make 
changes may be reluctant to modify their contract’s terms unless the 
troubled firm’s other contracts are similarly modified.300  The interactive 
complexities thus effectively create a huge collective action problem.  
One of the central goals of bankruptcy law is to help resolve this 
collective action problem.301  In the United States, for example, bankruptcy 
law accomplishes this by providing that creditors of a firm in bankruptcy302 
are bound, notwithstanding the voting rights in their contracts, to a form of 
supermajority voting.  The vote by the overwhelming majority of similarly 
situated creditors to change contractual terms would legally bind dissenting 
creditors.303 
Although this might at first appear to be unfair to dissenting creditors, 
supermajority voting has proved to operate fairly in the bankruptcy 
context.304  Because only similarly situated creditors can vote to bind 
dissenting creditors, and because any outcome will bind all such creditors 
alike, the outcome of a vote should benefit the claims of holdouts and 
dissenters as much as the claims of the supermajority.305  To the extent 
creditors voting in the supermajority are found to have conflicts with other 
creditors voting in their class, the conflicted creditor votes could be 
disallowed.306 
 
300. See id. at 98 (arguing that “the very existence of hold-outs can undermine the willingness 
of other creditors to agree to a reasonable restructuring plan”). 
301. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, 
Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1105 (1999) 
(noting that scholars generally agree that “overcoming collective action problems and maximizing 
the recovery of creditors are key goals of bankruptcy law”).  But cf. Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth 
N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 746–47 (2009) (arguing 
that bankruptcy law may not be effectively resolving certain current collective action problems). 
302. Bankruptcy law in the United States is governed by Title 11 of the United States Code, 
referred to as the Bankruptcy Code.  Financial firms other than banks are generally subject to the 
Bankruptcy Code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012) (excluding banks and certain other financial 
firms from the Bankruptcy Code).  Our Article does not engage the debate over whether financial 
firms more generally should be excluded from the Bankruptcy Code or whether the Bankruptcy 
Code should be amended to add a chapter dedicated to resolution mechanisms specifically adapted 
for financial firms.  For that debate, see, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 215, at 477–83 and 
Levitin, supra note 136, at 485–87, and see generally BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT (Kenneth E. 
Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012). 
303. 11 U.S.C. § 1126. 
304. See David Arthur Skeel Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 489–90 (1992) (comparing dissenting creditors in 
Chapter 11 proceedings to those in close corporations and arguing that in Chapter 11 proceedings 
supermajority voting is not necessary to protect dissenting creditors). 
305. See id. (observing that minority creditors receive protection in the bankruptcy voting 
scheme because all creditors of the same class are bound to the outcome). 
306. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (providing that the court may designate entities “whose 
acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good 
faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title”). 
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Other ex post strategies for reducing interactive complexity similarly 
focus on resolution mechanisms that resolve complex capital structures of 
troubled firms.  Although the Dodd-Frank Act requires banks and, to the 
extent designated as “systemically important,” other financial firms to be 
subject to a range of capital and similar requirements,307 the Act addresses 
the possibility that a firm could nevertheless end up failing by requiring 
these firms to submit a resolution plan—a so-called “living will”—that sets 
forth how the firm would liquidate in an orderly manner to minimize further 
systemic impact.308  This approach is not as flexible—and for a firm with an 
inherently profitable business, would not be as beneficial regarding 
nonsystemic consequences—as a debt restructuring that restructures the 
troubled firm to a viable capital structure.  The approach nonetheless is 
intended to reduce the breadth and depth of the systemic consequences of a 
default.309  Whether this approach would be more effective at reducing 
systemic consequences than a debt restructuring would appear to be a 
factual determination that should be made on a case-by-case basis.310 
Similarly, another possible ex post resolution mechanism to resolve 
complex capital structures of troubled firms is to require at least some 
portion of their debt to be in the form of so-called contingent capital.311  
Contingent-capital debt converts automatically into equity should certain 
specified events occur, such as a specified deterioration of a firm’s financial 
condition.312  Contingent capital operates effectively like a preplanned debt 
 
307. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325(b), 5365(i), 5462–5463 (2012).  The Dodd-Frank Act directs the 
Federal Reserve, for example, to set “prudential” capital standards for certain large financial 
firms, including a maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 15:1.  § 5365(j). 
308. See § 5365(d) (requiring a “resolution plan”). 
309. See § 5365(a) (establishing prudential standards for nonbank financial companies and 
banks “in order to prevent or mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States”). 
310. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 215, at 491–93 (comparing orderly resolution with 
bankruptcy); cf. Levitin, supra note 136, at 468–69 (arguing that “[a]t best . . . a living will’s value 
would be through its effect on ex ante behavior of TBTF firms”). 
311. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and 
the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 805–06 (2011).  
Professor Coffee’s proposal for “bail in” contingent-capital conversion calls for conversion on a 
gradual, incremental basis.  Id. at 830.  Debt would convert to a senior, nonconvertible preferred 
stock with cumulative dividends and voting rights.  Id. at 795.  This structure would allow for the 
dilution of equity to deter excessive risk taking, the creation of a class of risk-averse preferred 
shareholders to counteract the risk-favoring tendencies of common shareholders, and the 
avoidance of an “all-or-nothing” transition.  Id.; see also Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in 
Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE L.  REV. 1821, 1844 (2012) (suggesting that the threat 
of dilution of equity positions combined with the conversion feature of contingent convertible 
bonds could affect corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions); Stan 
Maes & Wim Schoutens, Contingent Capital: An In-Depth Discussion, 41 ECON. NOTES 59, 72 
(2012) (proposing triggering conversion by the rolling average stock price to combat short sellers 
“tempted to push down the stock price to profit from the resulting dilution of the bank’s stock”). 
312. Coffee, supra note 311, at 805. 
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restructuring.313  Contingent capital could be more effective at reducing 
systemic consequences than a debt restructuring if the amount of contingent 
capital that converts to equity is sufficient to restore the firm to a viable 
capital structure and the automatic conversion occurs precisely when 
needed.  Whether contingent capital is more broadly economically efficient 
is less certain, however, depending on such factors as the costs imposed by 
a contingent-capital requirement. 
In summary, in the context of financial regulation, ex post strategies 
for reducing interactive complexity would focus on resolving complex 
capital structures of troubled firms in order to reduce the breadth and depth 
of the consequences of a default.  Although firms could attempt to 
consensually restructure their debts to achieve viable capital structures, the 
interactive complexity of most firms makes that difficult to accomplish 
without the benefit of bankruptcy and similar laws that address creditor 
collective action problems. 
b. Reducing Tight Coupling.—Ex post strategies for reducing tight 
coupling would (as would ex post strategies for reducing interactive 
complexity) attempt to reduce the breadth and depth of the consequences of 
an accident.  In the case of tight coupling, however, the focus would be on 
time—slowing or suspending a buildup of consequences.314  These 
strategies could include the provision of liquidity, already discussed, to 
failing firms and markets,315 which would suspend their collapse.  As 
discussed below, however, there could be additional ex post strategies, 
depending on the context. 
In the context of financial markets, for example, strategies for halting 
precipitous market declines could also include circuit breakers316 and 
suspending mark-to-market accounting requirements.  First consider circuit 
breakers, which in this context means mechanisms to suspend securities 
trading in order to mitigate volatile price changes.317  Although increased 
speed in data transmission is generally associated with market efficiency, it 
also creates danger when algorithmically driven and automated securities 
 
313. Requiring contingent capital might, however, have the perverse effect of exacerbating 
systemic risk.  “For example, automatic conversions of debt claims to equity interests might create 
counterparty risk by reducing the value of firms holding those claims.”  Schwarcz, Controlling 
Financial Chaos, supra note 112, at 837. 
314. Recall that tight coupling can cause a disturbance to one part of a system to spread 
almost instantaneously to other parts of the system, and that, taken together, interactive 
complexity and tight coupling cause high-risk systems to pose a serious challenge for regulators. 
See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
315. See supra section IV(A)(1). 
316. Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1400 (observing the relationship between 
market circuit breakers and “instability in increasingly temporally complex markets”). 
317. Investor Bulletin: New Measures to Address Market Volatility, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
investor/alerts/circuitbreakersbulletin.htm (last modified Apr. 9, 2013). 
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trading cause pricing disparities.318  Circuit breakers would reduce those 
disparities by quickly suspending trading. 
In May 2010, for example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
experienced a pricing failure, plunging nearly 1000 points in twenty 
minutes, that was precipitated by the algorithmically driven selling of 
several billion dollars’ worth of derivatives contracts without regard to time 
or price.319  The SEC responded with a universal circuit-breaker rule under 
which the trading of a security would be halted on all exchanges for five 
minutes if its price moved ten percent or more within a five-minute 
period.320  The assumption behind the rule is that the five-minute pause 
should give traders sufficient time to recognize and respond to obvious 
pricing disparities inadvertently caused by a trading algorithm.321 
Next consider ex post strategies for reducing tight coupling by 
suspending mark-to-market accounting requirements.322  In its simplest 
form, mark-to-market accounting requires that a securities account be 
adjusted in response to a change in the market value of the securities.323  
Consider an investor who purchases securities on credit from a broker–
dealer using the securities as collateral.  The broker–dealer requires the 
investor to maintain a minimum collateral value to protect itself if the 
investor defaults.324  If the market value of the collateral falls below this 
minimum, the broker–dealer will require the investor to put up additional 
collateral (a “margin call”).325  If the investor fails to do so, the broker–
dealer can foreclose on the collateral.326 
Mark-to-market rules are generally believed to reduce risk.327  During 
times of extreme market volatility, however, they can cause “perverse 
effects on systemic stability.”328  The tight coupling of forced sales of 
 
318. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1398–99. 
319. Id. at 1399. 
320. Id. 
321. Id.  In this Article, we do not purport to examine the validity of this assumption or the 
substantive merits of market circuit breakers generally.  But see id. at 1399 n.206 (noting the 
“possibility that traders might mistakenly believe that a trading pause [resulting from a universal 
circuit breaker] was based on fundamental valuation issues,” thereby aggravating the problem). 
322. See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text (describing mark-to-market accounting). 
323. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 98, at 232. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
326. ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 71–72 (8th ed. 2008). 
327. See, e.g., Gikas A. Hardouvelis & Panayiotis Theodossiou, The Asymmetric Relation 
Between Initial Margin Requirements and Stock Market Volatility Across Bull and Bear Markets, 
15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1525, 1554–55 (2002) (finding a correlation between higher margin calls and 
decreased systemic risk and speculating that higher margin calls may bleed the irrationality out of 
the market until only sound bets are left). 
328. Rodrigo Cifuentes et al., Liquidity Risk and Contagion 9 (Bank of Eng. Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 264, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=824166. 
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securities to meet margin calls exerting downward pressure on securities 
prices, in turn requiring more forced sales, can lead to a downward spiral.329  
Such a spiral is especially likely to occur in the presence of leverage 330 and 
appears to describe the behavior of mortgage-backed securities prices in the 
recent financial crisis.331 
A possible ex post strategy for reducing this tight coupling would be to 
suspend mark-to-market accounting when its application might distort 
value, such as when it would require a securities account—especially an 
account whose securities have long-term maturities—to be adjusted in 
response to short-term pricing fluctuations.332  The critical question in 
applying this strategy, however, is how to distinguish between short-term 
pricing fluctuations and pricing fluctuations that represent real changes in 
the value of the securities.333 
That question, in turn, raises an even broader question: Whatever 
mechanisms exist for reducing tight coupling, when should those 
mechanisms become operative?  A mechanism that operates prematurely 
can interfere with otherwise efficient financial markets.334  On the other 
 
329. Id.; see also De Souza & Smirnov, supra note 157 (arguing that in a bad market, short-
term pressure to sell assets to raise cash for margin calls can lead to further mark-to-market losses 
for remaining assets, which triggers a whole new wave of selling, the process repeating itself until 
markets improve or the firm is wiped out, and referring to this process as a “Critical Liquidation 
Cycle”). 
330. De Souza & Smirnov, supra note 157, at 26–27. 
331. Rachel Evans, Bankers’ Counsel Poll: Banks Tell of Downward Spiral, INT’L FIN. L. 
REV., June 2008, at 16, 17–18; see also Ian Katz, FASB Eases Fair-Value Rules Amid Lawmaker 
Pressure (Update 5), BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2009, 17:21 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agfrKseJ94jc (reporting that William Isaac, former chairman of 
the FDIC, has called mark-to-market accounting “a major cause” of the financial crisis). 
332. See, e.g., R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis—Cause, Effect and 
Consequences, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING COMMUNITY DEV. L. 219, 225 (2008) (“Fair value 
accounting is driving and increasing investor fears about the solvency of many financial 
institutions.”); Peter J. Wallison, Fair Value Accounting: A Critique, FIN. SERVS. OUTLOOK (Am. 
Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Washington, D.C.), July 2008, at 2, available at 
http://www.aei.org/files/2008/07/28/20080728_23336JulyFSOg.pdf (“[M]arket-based movements 
in asset values can create substantial volatility in balance sheets and earnings reports—again, 
depending on a company’s business model.”); Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth., Address 
at the Cass Business School: Shadow Banking and Financial Instability 16 (Mar. 14, 2012) 
(transcript available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/speeches/0314-at.pdf) (observing that 
the “interaction of secured lending practices and mark-to-market accounting . . . exacerbates the 
risk of procyclicality and the volatility of credit creation”). 
333. In response to the recent financial crisis, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), which is delegated by the SEC authority to set accounting standards in the U.S., relaxed 
the mark-to-market accounting requirement by allowing firms to use “significant” judgment in 
gauging prices of debt securities on their books.  See Katz, supra note 331 (recounting reactions to 
FASB’s decision to relax standards); Facts About FASB, FASB, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/ 
FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 (noting that the SEC recognizes the FASB’s 
accounting standards as authoritative). 
334. This principle applies even to the timing of the application of mechanisms to reduce 
interactive complexity, such as the timing of the conversion of contingent-capital debt to equity-
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hand, it is important that the mechanism becomes operative before a 
systemic collapse becomes irremediable. 
Professors Bill McKelvey and Rossitsa Yalamova have closely 
examined this question, which they call a question of financial resilience 
engineering.335  They argue that the intervention point—the point at which a 
mechanism for reducing tight coupling becomes effective—should be the 
financial system’s relevant “tipping point[].”336  A tipping point means here 
a point at which a system radically changes behavior.337  For stock-market 
trading, for example, McKelvey and Yalamova contend that the relevant 
tipping point is the point at which “efficient market trading behaviour” 
becomes “the beginning of bubble-build-ups.”338  As with attempting to 
distinguish between short-term pricing fluctuations and pricing fluctuations 
that represent real changes in value,339 however, it may be difficult, except 
in retrospect, to know when that tipping point actually occurs. 
Assuming that a relevant tipping point is, in fact, ascertainable in 
advance, McKelvey and Yalamova also argue that for the intervention (i.e., 
the mechanism for reducing tight coupling) to be effective, it must be 
automatically triggered when the tipping point occurs.340  This requirement 
is intended to obviate human delay,341 especially that associated with a 
politically sensitive decision to intervene that could be influenced by 
“lobby-influenced politicians and government regulators.”342  Although 
McKelvey and Yalamova recognize that, in retrospect, some interventions 
 
based debt upon the occurrence of pre-agreed events.  The more likely the conversion is to occur, 
the more expensive it likely would be to sell the debt to investors. 
335. Bill McKelvey & Rossitsa Yalamova, Financial Resilience Engineering: Toward 
Automatic Action Formulas Against Risk and Reckless Endangerment, in GOVERNANCE AND 
CONTROL OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 133, 133 (Gunilla Sundström & Erik Hollnagel eds., 2011) 
[hereinafter McKelvey & Yalamova, Financial Resilience Engineering]. 
336. Id. at 137. 
337. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 9 (2002) (“The name given to that one 
dramatic moment . . . when everything can change all at once is the Tipping Point.”). 
338. Rossitsa Yalamova & Bill McKelvey, Using Power Laws and the Hurst Exponent to 
Identify Stock Market Trading Bubbles, in GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
85, 105 (Gunilla Sundström & Erik Hollnagel eds., 2011) [hereinafter McKelvey & Yalamova, 
Using Power Laws]. 
339. See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
340. McKelvey & Yalamova, Financial Resilience Engineering, supra note 335, at 134.  This 
assumes, of course, that the relevant tipping points could not only be accurately determined, but 
also accurately determined in advance.  The determination must be precise.  If the intervention 
occurs prior to the tipping point, the intervention would “interfere with unimpaired operation of 
efficient-market trading” because “virtually all of the currently suggested anti-crisis measures are 
too strong before [the tipping point].”  Id. at 144. 
341. McKelvey and Yalamova appear to accept the possibility that an intervention could be 
effective even if applied shortly after a tipping point occurs, noting evidence that “suggests that 
there is a fair amount of time between [a stock-market trading tipping point] and [market] crash 
for the resilience interventions to be imposed.”  Yalamova & McKelvey, Using Power Laws, 
supra note 338, at 103. 
342. McKelvey & Yalamova, Financial Resilience Engineering, supra note 335, at 134. 
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may be unwise, regulators could later decide to rescind those 
interventions.343  This effectively represents a judgment call that the harm 
of making a mechanism for reducing tight coupling prematurely operative 
should be outweighed by the benefit of assuring against the possibility of an 
irremediable financial market collapse. 
Such a judgment call may be analogized to the precautionary principle.  
Government agencies often go beyond strictly econometric cost–benefit 
modeling when designing regulation to address the risk of catastrophic 
events or large, irreversible effects where the actual level of risk is 
indeterminate,344 applying a precautionary principle that presumes benefits 
will outweigh costs.345  The analogy does not, however, follow the 
precautionary principle’s most utilized form, in which regulators decide to 
regulate an activity notwithstanding lack of decisive evidence of its harm.346  
Rather, the foregoing judgment call has a closer analogy to a stronger 
version of the precautionary principle—that when an activity (here, tight 
coupling) is shown to present a significant health or safety risk (here, a 
systemic risk), regulatory decisions should be made so as to prevent (here, 
through the mechanism for reducing tight coupling) the activity from being 
conducted notwithstanding scientific uncertainty as to the nature of the 
damage or the likelihood of its occurrence (here, by making that mechanism 
prematurely operative notwithstanding uncertainty as to if and when a 
tipping point will occur).347  This stronger version of the precautionary 
principle offers little practical guidance, however, to regulators.348  
Moreover, application of the stronger version of the precautionary principle 
can sometimes lead to unintended consequences.349 
 
343. Id. at 137. 
344. This type of regulation is discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 
91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 848–50 (2006).  A precautionary principle is often used when assessing 
the impact of human actions on complex systems, such as the environment and human health, 
where the consequences of actions may be unpredictable.  See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. 
THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 17 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the 
precautionary principle as it relates to scientific uncertainty concerning environmental issues); 
Robert G. Chambers & Tigran A. Melkonyan, Pareto Optimal Trade in an Uncertain World: 
GMOs and the Precautionary Principle, 89 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 520, 520 (2007) (discussing the 
precautionary principle as it relates to genetically engineered corn). 
345. Although this principle is often explicitly mentioned in international environmental 
regulations, it also is implicit in such domestic regulation as efforts to prevent terrorist attacks or 
regulation of the nuclear power industry, where high costs are justified even in the face of 
uncertain risk.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1003, 1005–07 (2003) (discussing the precautionary principle’s use in environmental regulation 
and terrorist attack prevention). 
346. See id. at 1017–18 (discussing the European Commission’s utilization of this form). 
347. See Sunstein, supra note 344, at 849 (discussing Europe’s strong understanding of the 
precautionary principle). 
348. Sunstein, supra note 345, at 1020. 
349. See, e.g., John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK 
VERSUS RISK 1, 1–2 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Weiner eds., 1995) (demonstrating that 
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Our Article does not purport to create formulas for determining 
relevant intervention points, nor do we attempt to assess the accuracy of the 
mathematical models advanced by McKelvey and Yalamova.350  We do 
observe, though, that those models appear to have been advanced in order to 
“prevent [financial market] bubble-build-ups and/or lessen their negative 
impact.”351  Our analysis has identified additional normative goals that 
could justify intervention, such as halting precipitous market declines.352 
B. The Costs of Ex Post Financial Regulation 
Like its ex ante counterpart, ex post systemic risk regulation would 
introduce direct and indirect costs into financial markets.  The costs 
associated with ex ante and ex post regulation differ, however.  Whereas ex 
ante regulation is incomplete, faces industry resistance, chills risk taking, 
and encourages regulatory arbitrage, ex post regulation leads to moral 
hazard, burdens taxpayers, produces false alarms, and creates inefficiencies.  
Neither set of costs should be dismissed. 
1. Moral Hazard.—Any ex post financial regulatory regime must 
confront the problem that it can have perverse ex ante consequences.  In 
particular, mitigative ex post regulation can give rise to moral hazard.  
Moral hazard occurs when a decision maker is incentivized to take risks 
beyond the level that he or she would have otherwise taken because some or 
all of the negative consequences of taking those risks are shifted to third 
parties.353  If ex post regulation were to allow for such risk-transferring 
behavior, then its effectiveness in improving financial stability would be 
reduced. 
 
interventions to reduce one risk may induce new countervailing risks); Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Precaution in a Multirisk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 1509, 1509 (Dennis D. Paustenbach ed., 2002) (arguing that although “precaution” can 
be a desirable strategy in some cases, strong versions of the precautionary principle can induce 
unintended countervailing risks, that the goal should be optimal rather than maximal precaution, 
and that actual regulation often moderates the degree of precaution in order to avoid these 
unintended risks). 
350. McKelvey and Yalamova themselves admit that their algorithms will not always predict 
tipping points.  Nonetheless, they observe that “[e]ven if only half of the . . . market crashes are 
predicted early on, the reduction of the impact on the broader economies would translate into 
savings of billions of US dollars.”  McKelvey & Yalamova, Financial Resilience Engineering, 
supra note 335, at 148. 
351. Id. at 133.  Moreover, McKelvey and Yalamova argue that these bubble buildups are 
caused by herding behavior.  Id. at 134.  We do not purport to assess all the possible causes of 
market bubbles. 
352. See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text (suggesting the adoption of financial 
stability as a normative goal). 
353. Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 183, 204–05 (2009). 
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The primary concern relating to moral hazard in financial firms is that 
the presence of safety nets for either those firms or the markets in which 
they participate will encourage them to take excessive risks.354  Safety nets 
shield financial firms from having to sustain the full downside of taking on 
risk.355  Asymmetrically exposed to the consequences of risk taking, 
decision makers will respond by ignoring that portion of the risk from 
which they believe they are protected and increase the fragility of the 
financial system.356 
Market discipline is unlikely to curb excessive risk taking by firms that 
enjoy safety-net protection.  Investors can generally be counted on to 
impose risk premiums on a firm that is suboptimally managed.357  In 
analyzing a firm’s financial condition, however, investors consider the 
likelihood that the firm will be deemed TBTF.358  Investors in TBTF firms 
exhibit moral hazard when they treat those firms as safer than non-TBTF 
firms, accepting lower risk premiums in their transactions with them.359 
Moral hazard is most severe when decision makers are insulated from 
any negative impact from their actions.360  Accordingly, efforts to control 
moral hazard typically involve techniques that allow market discipline to 
continue to play a role in influencing behavior.361  This end could be 
 
354. One could also argue that mitigative ex post regulation in any form can give rise to 
“regulatory moral hazard.”  Regulators may be more likely to be lax if they believe that any 
resulting negative financial market consequences will be contained than if they believe that they 
will be held accountable for allowing a systemic crisis to develop.  Cf. Bert Ely, Regulatory Moral 
Hazard: The Real Moral Hazard in Federal Deposit Insurance, 4 INDEP. REV. 241, 247 (1999) 
(making the related point that deposit insurance fosters laxity among regulators who can be less 
diligent than if depositors or taxpayers were in a first-loss position with respect to bank 
insolvencies); Marco A. Espinosa-Vega et al., Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture 
3 (IMF Inst., Working Paper No. WP/11/193, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1910496 (describing regulatory forbearance as arising primarily because the failure of a financial 
firm under a regulator’s watch is likely to be politically costly for the regulator and because, given 
time, the firm may recover).  Thus, measures designed to contain a financial failure might promote 
regulatory forbearance. 
355. See, e.g., Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate “Too Big 
to Fail” Non-Bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 840–41 (2010) (discussing the 
safety net of deposit insurance protecting against depositor runs on banks). 
356. See id. at 841 (describing how deposit insurance creates a moral hazard by distorting the 
incentives of depositors, who “can no longer be relied upon to exert market discipline on the bank 
and curb overly risky behavior, as they lack the incentives to do so”). 
357. See id. at 840 (describing how uninsured bank creditors can demand higher rates of 
returns or withdraw funds entirely from banks engaged in risky activities). 
358. See supra notes 228–38 and accompanying text. 
359. See Hashmall, supra note 355, at 841 (“[M]oral hazard refers to the risk that 
shareholders, managers, or creditors of large financial institutions will take fewer precautions 
when they think the government will protect them.”). 
360. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 209 (predicting investors will be less 
cautious and companies will tolerate more risk as a result of a government bailout). 
361. Id. at 238–39 (recommending that market discipline supplement other regulatory 
approaches). 
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accomplished with respect to ex post financial regulation in several ways.  
For example, the safety-net provider could adopt a credible policy of 
constructive ambiguity, not committing ex ante to whether or how it might 
attempt to support any given firm.362 
Another approach to controlling moral hazard of firms is through the 
use of safety-net protection insurance in which TBTF firms are required to 
participate and pay premiums based on the systemic risk they pose.363  Such 
risk-based pricing would eliminate the moral hazard commonly associated 
with, for example, deposit insurance, because risk-sensitive premiums 
should induce financial firms to take more socially efficient risks.364 
Alternatively, ex post financial regulation can be combined with 
bankruptcy-type discounts, or “haircuts,” that impose losses on a TBTF 
firm’s creditors as long as the haircut mechanism used is structured so as 
not to undermine the systemic-stability objectives of ex post financial 
regulation.365  Like risk-adjusted premiums, haircuts cause decision makers 
to internalize the systemic costs of their risk taking.366  Creditors who 
believe that they will suffer haircuts upon the failure of a firm should 
 
362. Id. at 226.  Constructive ambiguity can also be applied to the decision whether to 
stabilize any given financial market.  Its effectiveness in reducing moral hazard depends on the 
extent to which it is unclear how the safety-net provider will respond to a potential failure.  Moral 
hazard, at either the firm or the investor level, cannot be eliminated through constructive 
ambiguity because certain firms or markets may be so important that their stabilization is 
predictable with a high degree of certainty.  See id. at 226–27 (discussing having a private 
liquidity provider of last resort follow a constructive ambiguity policy and the need for a priority 
system for determining which parties receive support). 
363. For a discussion of how existing federal deposit insurance might be restructured along 
these lines, see Ely, supra note 354, at 250.  In addition, Professor Steven Schwarcz has argued 
that a market liquidity provider of last resort can address market breakdowns while minimizing 
moral hazard.  Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 225–30.  The market liquidity provider 
would aim to stabilize financial markets in times of financial distress.  Id. at 225.  Schwarcz 
contemplates that the market liquidity provider would be funded by charging insurance-like 
premiums to market participants.  Id. at 226.  But see Levitin, supra note 136, at 473 (questioning 
the feasibility of using insurance schemes to address systemic risk).  A separate, but related, 
question is whether the existence of a market liquidity provider of last resort might create a 
distortion by encouraging the growth of financial markets precisely to qualify for such liquidity 
protection.  That might well be the case for formal markets, such as stock exchanges, but it would 
unlikely be the case for informal markets, such as most debt markets, which grow organically and 
not by command and control.  This Article’s analysis of a market liquidity provider of last resort is 
primarily applicable to debt markets. 
364. See Ely, supra note 354, at 250 (asserting that risk-sensitive premiums encourage better 
risk taking by banks, generally optimizing bank risk taking across the entire economy). 
365. Professor Adam Levitin argues that to avoid placing undue stress on creditors during 
times of crisis, the haircut mechanism must be flexible, allowing haircuts to be imposed on some 
creditors immediately at the time of the bailout, while allowing other, systemically critical 
creditors “to take their haircuts over time.”  Levitin, supra note 136, at 440–41, 510–13. 
366. See id. at 508–09 (stating that haircuts distribute a portion of the cost of the bailout to the 
failed firms’ counterparties). 
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charge the firm a higher price to reflect that possibility.367  Thus, the more 
risky a firm is, the more costly it should be for the firm to obtain credit. 
The likely tradeoff between ex post regulation and moral hazard does 
not mean that we should dismiss the notion of ex post regulation.  Systemic-
risk mitigation has a valuable role to play in supplementing market 
discipline368 and ex ante regulation369 in furthering systemic stability.  On 
the other hand, it is reasonable to be concerned about, and to try to 
minimize, the moral hazard that might accompany ex post regulation. 
2. Taxpayer Burden.—In proposing safety nets, we are sensitive to the 
concern that taxpayers may be called upon to fund them.  The use of 
government resources to assist distressed firms or markets, whose need for 
support may have been self-inflicted, is justifiably troubling.  Moreover, it 
has become politically unacceptable.370 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to assess the expected 
costs to taxpayers of implementing safety nets.371  Rather, we wish to point 
out that, to a limited extent, safety nets can be designed to apportion 
potential losses arising from insolvency among three constituencies, only 
one (government) of which relies directly on taxpayer support.  The other 
two, creditors and private insurers, can also participate in funding safety 
nets for distressed firms and markets.  We described in section IV(B)(1) 
how imposing haircuts on creditors of insolvent firms can impose market 
discipline on TBTF firms.  Haircuts also serve to limit taxpayer losses when 
safety nets are used.  When haircuts are imposed on a firm’s creditors—that 
is, when haircuts are combined with safety nets—it is possible to apportion 
some losses resulting from a firm’s failure to creditors.372  Losses can also 
be allocated to TBTF firms through mutual insurance.373  Finally, one of us 
has suggested that yet another way to shield taxpayers from having to bear 
safety-net costs is to give private financiers priority on new loans to 
troubled firms.374 
How losses attributable to safety nets will in fact be distributed is 
difficult to predict.  We have described ways in which loss-distribution 
 
367. See id. at 509 (arguing that haircuts cause TBTF firms to “bear the price of the haircut 
mechanism in the firms’ dealings with counterparties”). 
368. See generally Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114 (discussing systemic risk and the 
considerations for regulating systemic risk). 
369. See supra notes 187–96 and accompanying text. 
370. It is for this reason that the Dodd-Frank Act approaches systemic risk regulation mainly 
through ex ante regulation.  See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1370 n.85. 
371. For a detailed discussion of the measurement issues associated with government bailouts, 
see Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 
196–225 (2010). 
372. Levitin, supra note 136, at 440. 
373. Id. at 473. 
374. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 226–30. 
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schemes can be structured to limit the imposition on taxpayers of the costs 
of safety nets.  It seems clear, however, that some form of taxpayer funding 
will always be needed to the extent that the nongovernmental resource pool 
from which safety-net funds can be drawn is insufficient to stabilize 
markets or that capital-market funding is unavailable. 
3. The Danger of False Positives.—Limiting the harmful 
consequences of a firm or market failure makes it difficult to know with 
certainty whether those consequences would have been systemically 
significant.  Committing to ex post mitigation of financial failures thus 
raises the possibility that firms or markets will be rescued unnecessarily.  
Such “Type I errors,” or “false positives,” occur when an indication is given 
that a condition exists when in fact it does not.375  In the context of the 
financial system, Type I errors would consist of false alarms prompting 
costly efforts to safeguard the financial system when it is not endangered. 
As with taxpayer liability, Type I errors cannot be eliminated, but they 
can be reduced.  The risk of Type I errors is related to the risk tolerance of 
the safety-net provider.376  Higher risk tolerance is associated with tighter 
criteria for deeming an event to be systemically significant and will lead to 
fewer Type I errors.377 
Of course, decreasing the probability of Type I errors usually increases 
the probability of “Type II errors,” or “false negatives.”378  Ex post Type II 
errors would consist of failed alarms.  In other words, they would occur 
when a safety-net provider responded too weakly or with undue delay to 
distress that proves systemically significant. 
4. Inefficiencies.—We have already described the potential for one 
form of ex post regulation, safety nets, to produce financial market 
inefficiencies through moral hazard.379  The other form of ex post regulation 
we have set forth, disrupting transmission chains, can also undermine the 
goal of financial market efficiency through its impact on financial 
processes.  We argued, for example, that one way to make the financial 
system safer would be to reduce its interactive complexity.380  Perrow 
described the dangers of complex interactions within a system as producing 
unfamiliar or unexpected sequences that are either hidden or not readily 
 
375. Levitin, supra note 136, at 499. 
376. See id. (describing agencies’ risk aversion as contributing to a higher number of Type I 
errors). 
377. Id. 
378. See id. at 500 (describing Congress’s greater reluctance to initiate bailouts as reducing 
Type I errors but leading to more Type II errors). 
379. See supra section IV(A)(1). 
380. See supra subsection IV(A)(2)(a). 
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understood.381  Complexity, whether in financial assets, securities, or 
markets, makes it more difficult to understand and predict the effects of 
exogenous shocks.382  It also makes it harder for firms to predict how 
exogenous events will affect their financial condition, and it makes it harder 
for regulators to predict whether the failure of a firm or market will have 
systemic effects.383 
One could address these difficulties by creating resolution mechanisms 
to resolve complex capital structures of troubled firms.384  Unless carefully 
designed, however, these mechanisms might backfire, reducing efficiency.  
For example, the “living will” resolution plan approach would not be as 
flexible and, for a firm with an inherently profitable business, would not be 
as beneficial regarding nonsystemic consequences as a debt restructuring 
that restructures the troubled firm to a viable capital structure.385  And the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the contingent-capital approach would be 
subject to various factors, including whether the amount of contingent 
capital that converts to equity is sufficient to restore the firm to a viable 
capital structure and whether the automatic conversion occurs precisely 
when needed.386  One also could attempt to address these difficulties by 
simplifying the financial system through, for example, increased 
standardization of financial products.387  Complexity, however, can be used 
beneficially.  It can, for example, arise in response to investor demand for 
securities that meet their peculiar commercial needs or risk preferences.388  
In such instances, complexity enhances the functioning of financial 
markets.389 
The other way to disrupt transmission chains that we have suggested, 
reducing tight coupling, may also tend to reduce the efficiency of the 
financial system if not designed carefully.  Tight coupling implies minimal 
buffers between system components.390  Changes in the state of components 
are transmitted through the system directly and rapidly.  Human judgment 
 
381. PERROW, supra note 137, at 130. 
382. See id. at 143–44 (stating that it is more difficult to predict or diagnose unanticipated 
interdependencies in the operation of complex systems). 
383. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1389–90 (noting that complexities in 
“financial products and markets” can produce “information uncertainty”). 
384. See supra notes 291–313 and accompanying text. 
385. See supra notes 308–10 and accompanying text. 
386. See supra notes 312–14 and accompanying text. 
387. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1390 & nn.170–71 (discussing 
standardizing the features of exchange-traded securities as a means for reducing complexity in 
financial products and markets). 
388. See id. at 1390 (indicating that complex financial instruments can enable firms to provide 
“a variety of options relating to risk, return, and timing of cash flows”). 
389. See id. at 1390–91 (referencing the “efficiencies” complexity can create by allowing 
“market participants to design financial products that respond to or anticipate investor needs”). 
390. PERROW, supra note 137, at 148. 
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is given little opportunity to intervene.  Introducing buffers between 
components would diminish the ease with which component failures could 
travel.  On the other hand, tight coupling in the financial system may arise 
over time because it can increase operating efficiency.  In times of financial 
stability, buffers can be wasteful.  For example, a mechanism that operates 
prematurely can interfere with otherwise efficient financial markets.391  And 
it can be difficult to know, in advance, precisely when such a mechanism 
should become operational.392 
V. Balancing Ex Ante and Ex Post Financial Regulation 
Our analysis thus far has shown that, although both ex ante and ex post 
regulation can be effective at reducing systemic risk, neither is adequate, on 
its own, as a strategy for protecting the financial system.  Regulators must 
therefore determine how to balance the two approaches in pursuing the 
goals of economic efficiency and financial stability.393  Our study of the 
financial system is also useful in addressing this question. 
The limits associated with ex ante and ex post regulation discussed in 
subparts III(B) and IV(B), respectively, suggest that the factors relevant to 
choosing the optimal mix of ex ante relative to ex post regulation are the 
predictability of financial crises, the feasibility of adopting financial 
regulation,394 and the ability of regulators to implement their programs 
without giving rise to substantial market inefficiencies or regulatory 
arbitrage.  More specifically, regulators’ reliance on ex ante relative to ex 
post regulation should be greater, (1) the more confident regulators are in 
their ability to model the dynamics of the financial system, (2) the more 
controls exist for regulating systemically significant activities, and (3) the 
more capable regulators are at implementing their policies without giving 
rise to substantial market inefficiencies or regulatory arbitrage. 
The better regulators understand and can accurately predict how the 
financial system behaves, the better they can identify how changes in the 
state of each element of the system affect each other system element and the 
system as a whole.  In the course of the supervisory review process, 
regulators evaluate the safety and soundness of financial market participants 
in order to assess whether they pose a threat to financial stability because of 
their financial condition; their scope, size, scale, and concentration; their 
 
391. See supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
392. See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
393. For an indication, at least in the securities law context, that greater government ex ante 
regulatory involvement suggests less government ex post involvement in enforcement of those 
regulations, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 229, 257 (2007). 
394. This includes the feasibility of adopting ex post financial regulation.  Cf. E-mail from 
Anna Gelpern, supra note 186 (observing that the political economy of financial regulation may 
be biased in favor of ex ante regulation). 
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interconnectedness; and the nature of their activities.  Regulators who 
possess a sound grasp of the financial system’s workings will be in a better 
position to identify and use their supervisory authority to prevent the 
collapse of critical but failing financial firms or markets. 
There will always be a risk, however, that regulators will overestimate 
the soundness of their models, especially in a rapidly changing financial 
environment, or that they will overestimate their understanding of those 
models.  In this regard, we note that the degree to which regulators can 
accurately model the financial system depends in large part on the 
transparency of financial firms and markets.  The combination of market 
competition and regulatory arbitrage has led financial firms to develop 
increasingly complex financial products.395  These products have, in turn, 
added complexity to financial markets through their increased linkages 
within the financial system.396  Moreover, financial market participants are 
often better staffed than their regulators.397  The less opaqueness regulators 
confront in financial markets, whether because of complexity or relative 
capacity limits, the more successful they will be at monitoring the financial 
sector for early warning signs of a financial crisis. 
It is not enough of course, for regulators to be able to identify the 
conditions that could give rise to a financial crisis.  They must also possess 
the necessary tools to make the financial system robust.  This implies that 
regulators be empowered to implement preventive regulation, both to 
reduce the likelihood that systemically significant firms or markets will fail 
and to disrupt their contagion effects should they nonetheless do so.  The 
current challenge in this regard is that financial services interests will curb 
the Dodd-Frank Act administratively and legislatively.  Going forward, the 
public’s priorities are likely to turn away from financial systemic risk and 
the financial services industry is likely to reassert its dominance over 
financial regulatory policy. 
Financial regulators also confront the difficulty of drawing the fine 
line between allowing firms and markets to operate freely and addressing 
market failures.  As discussed in section IV(A)(2), for example, a 
mechanism for reducing tight coupling that operates prematurely can 
interfere with otherwise efficient financial markets, but it is important that 
the mechanism become operative before a systemic collapse turns 
 
395. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 1376–77 (describing how “investor 
demand for securities that more precisely match their risk and reward preferences” and regulatory 
arbitrage have led to increased complexity of financial products). 
396. Id. at 1370–71, 1378 (asserting that “[o]ver time, innovations in financial products have 
increased the linkages between nodes,” which are institutions within the financial system). 
397. Alan Murray, Future of Finance (A Special Report)—Getting Started: Sir Howard 
Davies of the London School of Economics and Political Science Offers Action Items for Fixing 
the Financial System, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527 
48704825504574585902675259622.html. 
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irremediable.398  A further challenge to ex ante regulation is the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage.  The easier it is for financial market participants to 
operate outside the regulatory reach of any given jurisdiction, the more 
likely it will be that systemically important activities will be located where 
they are least regulated.399  Even when the conditions are favorable for ex 
ante regulation, however, ex post regulation will remain a necessary 
component of a comprehensive regulatory strategy for addressing financial 
systemic risk.  As we have emphasized, under conditions of interactive 
complexity and tight coupling, system accidents are inevitable.400  Unless ex 
post approaches are in place to deal with the onset of a financial crisis, 
regulators will be forced to respond with ad hoc measures, which are likely 
to be suboptimally designed or timed. 
Recent financial regulatory developments in the United States are 
decidedly antagonistic to ex post approaches, however.  The Dodd-Frank 
Act, which overhauled financial regulation following the Financial Crisis, 
embodies this attitude.  According to one of the Act’s provisions, if the 
Secretary of the Treasury designates a “covered financial company” that 
defaults or is at risk of default as systemically significant, that firm must be 
liquidated under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
receivership.401  Another provision prohibits federal assistance to swaps 
entities.402  Yet another sharply limits the power of the Federal Reserve to 
make emergency loans to insolvent firms, thereby restricting the Federal 
Reserve’s long-standing ability to act as a liquidity provider of last resort to 
financial firms.403  And no provisions appear to grant regulators the power 
to regulate markets, per se.  On their face, these provisions (and the 
omission of others) seem to conflate ex post regulation with indiscriminate 
bailouts and taxpayer expropriation.  As a result, they reject ex post 
regulation entirely, increasing the risk that a systemically important 
financial firm or market will collapse, with systemic consequences to other 
financial firms and markets and ultimately to the real economy. 
As we have demonstrated in this Article, financial regulation aimed at 
mitigating the impact of financial failures can be explicitly designed to 
address the worst fears associated with ex post responses.  Thoughtful 
regulatory design can control moral hazard and limit taxpayer liability, such 
as through risk-based insurance arrangements and loss-sharing with private 
creditors of firms that receive public support.  It can also reduce, though not 
 
398. See supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
399. See supra notes 197–204 and accompanying text. 
400. See supra notes 137–46 and accompanying text. 
401. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 204–205, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454–58 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5384 (2012)). 
402. § 716, 124 Stat. at 1648–51 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 2305). 
403. § 1101(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 2113–15 (codified 12 U.S.C. 343); see supra notes 240–44 and 
accompanying text. 
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eliminate, the possibility of ad hoc decision making in times of crisis by 
operating transparently, equitably, and with minimal taxpayer burden. 
VI. Conclusion 
We conclude that ex ante, or preventive, regulation is an incomplete 
policy approach to solving the problem of financial systemic risk.  
Designing a comprehensive systemic risk regulatory policy also requires 
implementing ex post, or mitigative, measures focused on limiting the 
harmful consequences of financial failures that are not prevented.  
Acknowledging the importance of both ex ante and ex post measures in 
regulating systemic risk is only the first step, however, toward safeguarding 
the financial system.  Regulators must further decide how to balance the 
two approaches.  Our Article has suggested guidelines for selecting an 
appropriate mix of ex ante and ex post regulatory strategies for safeguarding 
the financial system. 
